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The dissertation is composed of three separate essays.  The first essay critically 
reviews the current status of strategic human resource management (SHRM) research. 
I argue that the research to date in this field is built upon several assumptions whose 
validity may not endure beyond the borders of the United Sates, where much of the 
existing research in this realm has been conducted. The paper contextualizes the 
mainstream SHRM research by comparing institutional environments around human 
resource management between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. 
Finally I provide reflections and suggestions on how the contextualized understanding 
of the literature can contribute to resolving and reframing two central concerns of 
SHRM research 
The second paper addresses a major concern relevant to international business 
research in qualitatively investigating how subsidiaries of multinational companies 
deal with dual institutional pressures from the parent company and the local 
environment. Using Chinese trade unions as an empirical context, I develop a model 
that explains how the dual institutional pressures and organizational characteristics 
jointly shape the subsidiary’ attitudes and behaviors towards a unique local 
employment relations practice. I analyze qualitative data I have collected in my 
thirteen months of fieldwork for this study. 
 The third paper involves a quantitative data analysis of Chinese companies in 
the manufacturing sector. The major concern of the paper is whether unions and 
employer-provided training affect firm performance differently depending on the 
ownership structure. I argue that recognizing unions in China is more beneficial for 
foreign firms than for domestic ones because it reduces the problem of legitimacy 
deficiency in the local market. I also argue that the positive impact of employer-
provided training on firm performance is stronger in foreign owned firms than in 
domestic firms in China because foreign companies, unlike domestic firms, can expect 
an additional benefit of training: the cross-border knowledge inflow. The results of 
regression analyses generally support the hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODCUTION 
 
Each of the three studies in this dissertation addresses an important issue about 
the people management practices of multinational corporations in the People’s 
Republic of China. The first study (chapter 2) points out the limitations of U.S.-based 
strategic human resource management (SHRM) research, and discusses how China-
based research can contribute to the advancement of the field. Based on firsthand 
observations in the field and a careful literature review, I argue that the major premises 
regarding institutional environments in U.S.-based SHRM research do not hold in the 
context of China’s transitional economy. The second study (chapter 3) explores the 
variance and determinants of industrial relations practices of multinational 
corporations in China. In this chapter, I analyze the qualitative data that I collected 
during my extensive fieldwork in coastal cities of China. The final study (chapter 4) 
involves quantitative data analysis of Chinese companies in the manufacturing sector. 
It investigates the impact of unions and training investment on the performance of 
foreign-invested companies in China.  
These studies were initially motivated by personal observations made during 
my fieldwork in China between June 2006 and July 2007. As a researcher who is 
interested in the human resource management and employment relations of 
multinational corporations, I had sound reasons to choose China for the site of my 
fieldwork. First, China has the largest workforce of any nation in the world. Therefore, 
no theories of human resource management and industrial relations can claim 
universal validity until they have been proved to be useful in explaining the 
phenomenon in China. Second, China is the country that has attracted the largest 
amount of foreign direct investment in recent decades. Almost no other country can 
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provide a better setting to observe the issues of people management in multinational 
companies as vividly as in China. In addition, the massive transformation of the 
Chinese society, especially in the area of industrial relations systems, implies 
unprecedented opportunities for social scientists to develop new insights on the 
processes and consequences of interactions between changing institutional 
environments and organizations. 
The fieldwork began with a simple set of exploratory questions about the 
variance, antecedents, and consequences of human resource management of 
multinational corporations in China. Traveling across 11 coastal cities, I interviewed 
over 100 individuals in foreign companies, unions, and government offices. Among 
many interesting observations that I made during the fieldwork, three findings were 
most conducive to the development of the three studies in this dissertation.  
First, I realized that the existing theories of human resource management, 
which evolved primarily in developed economies, do not sufficiently explain human 
resource management and employment relations in China. For example, U.S.-based 
human resource management research almost ignores the legal compliance issue. 
However, for Chinese managers, legal compliance is one of the critical strategic 
concerns because local regulatory environments continue to change dramatically, and 
law enforcement practices have a significant degree of variance depending on the 
region, industry, firm ownership, and personal network. This insight was developed 
into the study in chapter 2 that explores the limitations of U.S.-based SHRM literature.  
Second, I observed that union recognition is a critical concern for multinational 
corporations in China. Since the Chinese government introduced the policy of 
“harmonious society” in 2004, companies in China have come under increasing social 
pressure to recognize unions. As shown in the case of the forced unionization of Wal-
Mart China in 2006, some foreign multinational companies are specifically targeted by 
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local unions. In general, union recognition is a complex and confusing issue for 
foreign-owned firms in China because Chinese unions are quite different from the 
counterparts in their home countries. In chapter 3, I qualitatively investigate how 
subsidiaries of multinational companies make sense of this unique local institution and 
what influences their responses toward it. 
My third observation was that managers in the field have polarized views on 
the performance implications of unions and training investment in China. With respect 
to union recognition, some managers believed that unions will undermine the 
effectiveness of management by encouraging unsolicited governmental interventions 
through trade union networks. Yet, others believed that unions can contribute to firm 
performance through facilitating positive interactions among managers, employees, 
and government authorities. With respect to training investment, some believed that 
training investment will contribute to firm performance by increasing employees’ 
competence, but others suggested that training investment will not be paid off due to 
the high mobility in the Chinese labor market. The study in the chapter 4 attempts to 
resolve this debate by quantitative data analysis of a large national dataset. 
Below, I will present an overview of the three studies that focuses on their 
main arguments and core findings.  
 
A Contextualized Understanding of Strategic Human Resource Management 
 
Over the past three decades, strategic perspectives have emerged as a useful 
framework to investigate human resource management in the United States. As a 
separate field of study, SHRM is distinguished from traditional streams of human 
resource management in that it emphasizes the set (or bundles) of human resource 
management practices over individual practices, and it focuses on the organizational 
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outcomes rather than attitudes and behaviors of individuals. A number of empirical 
studies have shown that progressively designed human resource systems, such as high-
performance work systems, lead to higher firm performance. Recently, scholars have 
attempted to replicate the U.S.-based findings in other national contexts. 
In chapter 2, I argue that the mainstream SHRM research is biased toward the 
institutional contexts of the liberal market economy of the United States and, 
therefore, the empirical findings and theoretical models based on these assumptions 
may not have equal relevance in other national contexts, especially in the transitional 
economy of China.  
The institutional bias in the mainstream SHRM literature is embedded in 
several assumptions on which major theories are built. One of these assumptions is the 
complete autonomy of managers. Major theories of SHRM have assumed that 
companies can choose their human resource management systems without considering 
regulatory and normative constraints. The human resource architecture model 
proposed by Lepak and Snell (1999) is a good example in that the theory assumed that 
less valued individuals can be arbitrarily externalized without considering any 
institutional constraint. This assumption, however, may seriously undermine the 
explanatory power of the theory in the context of regulated labor markets. In China, 
for example, the government has recently introduced a series of labor regulations that 
constrain the discretion of managers in terms of hiring and firing decisions. 
Prior studies also have assumed that the technical aspects of human resource 
management are widely institutionalized so that companies need to take one step 
further (e.g., adopting high-performance work systems) to assure the competitive 
advantage through people. This assumption, however, may not hold in countries where 
human resource management itself is a newly introduced concept. In the transitional 
economy of China, for instance, human resource management practices, such as 
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performance-based compensation and market-oriented recruiting, have been 
implemented only recently.  
The influence of individualistic culture, as found in the mainstream SHRM 
literature, is also problematic. The influence of individualism is especially evident in 
theories that have explained the causal linkage between human resource management 
practices and firm performance. For example, some studies have argued that human 
resource management practices that encourage employees to develop long-term 
relationships with colleagues will positively contribute to firm performance (e.g., Dess 
& Shaw, 2001; Leana  & Van Buren, 1999). Although the fundamentals of this 
argument may still hold in collectivistic societies like China, the existing theories 
would not be equally useful across nations with different cultures. In China, for 
example, managers are quite concerned about the negative impact of certain 
collectivistic behaviors (e.g., collective turnover and nepotism in performance 
evaluations) on firm performance. In other words, relationship-oriented human 
resource management practices might exacerbate the liability of social capital rather 
than maximize the benefits of social capital in collectivistic cultures.  
The findings that the existing SHRM research is heavily influenced by the 
institutional and cultural environments of the United States lead me to argue that the 
contextualized understanding of SHRM can contribute to resolving and reframing two 
central concerns of SHRM research: (a) the existence of universally effective human 
resource systems and (b) the causal link between human resource systems and firm 
performance.  
The existence of universally effective human resource systems has been 
debated extensively in the SHRM literature over the past two decades (Delery & Doty,  
1996; Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005). Proponents of the universalistic perspective 
have argued that certain human resource management practices are inherently 
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effective. Therefore, they posited that companies are likely to achieve high 
performance if they adopt those practices. The so-called “high-performance work 
system” is the set of human resource practices that is most frequently referred as the 
universally effective human resource management system (Huselid, 1995).  
Critics of this perspective, however, have argued that the value of human 
resource management systems depends on various contingent factors such as the 
strategies and business environments of firms (Miles & Snow, 1973). According to 
this view, it is more important to assure the “fit” between human resource systems and 
contextual factors than to adopt so-called “best practices” such as high-performance 
work systems.  
I argue that a contextualized approach to SHRM is valuable and much needed 
to resolve or advance the best practice-best fit debate. Specifically, in order for the 
best practice argument to be proven valid, certain practices or a set of practices need to 
be shown to improve firm performance in different national contexts. Therefore, the 
existence of universally effective best practices can be validated only when we have 
enough evidence that a certain set of practices is shown to be equally effective across 
different national contexts.  
The best fit argument also needs to be informed by the context sensitive 
studies. In the past, researchers have focused primarily on the fit between firm strategy 
and human resource management practices. Only recently, researchers have begun to 
explore contingency factors beyond firm strategy, such as market segment (Batt, 2002) 
and industry contexts (Datta et al., 2005; Toh, Morgeson, Campion, 2008) . The 
contextualized approach to SHRM contributes to this emerging stream of research by 
emphasizing the potential moderating effect of national contextual factors on the 
relationship between human resource management systems and firm performance.  
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Determinants of the Industrial Relations Practices of Subsidiaries 
 
A major concern of international business research is how subsidiaries of 
multinational companies deal with dual institutional pressures from the parent 
company and the local environment. A qualitative investigation of this issue is detailed 
in chapter 3. 
Research in the area of international human resource management has noted 
that multinational companies have to cope with the dual imperatives of globalization 
and localization (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Rosenzweig, & Nohria, 1994). While 
earlier studies had focused on concerns of the parent companies such as expatriate 
management, researchers have more recently begun to examine the issue of 
globalization and localization in the context of local subsidiaries, especially those 
located in emerging markets such as China (Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2005). My 
research directly addresses the major concern of international human resource 
management and examines the causes of multinational companies’ employment 
practice strategies in the host country.  
Studies in this subject have been widely influenced by the development of 
neoinstitutional theory. The theoretical perspective that had dominated the earlier 
works is the framework of isomorphism proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). In 
this stream of research, behaviors of subsidiaries were understood as the replication of 
either the practices of the parent firm or those of local counterparts. DiMaggio and 
Powell’s threefold framework of isomorphism (coercive, normative, and mimetic 
isomorphic pressures) was adopted to explain the similarities of human resource 
practices among networks within multinational companies. For example, Rosenzweig 
and Singh’s (1991) influential study articulated that subsidiaries of multinational 
companies are under pressure to conform to the global standards within multinational 
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networks as well as the local norms. Building on Rosenzweig and Singh’s work, 
Taylor, Beechler, and Napier (1996) proposed a theoretical model in which the impact 
of isomorphism in the host country on subsidiary human resource systems is 
moderated by the strength of isomorphism within the multinational networks. Taylor 
et al. identified a series of structural elements that enable the subsidiaries’ behaviors to 
become more (or less) similar to those of the parent company. This line of argument 
has been validated by several empirical studies on subsidiaries in developed countries 
like the United States and United Kingdom (e.g., Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). 
One of the prominent contributions of the earlier studies concerning the 
institutional perspective of subsidiary management is that behaviors of subsidiaries are 
understood as not only being resultant from the rational decisions of home country 
headquarters, but also from the process of legitimacy-seeking efforts of subsidiaries 
(Tempel, Edwards, Ferner, Muller-Camen, & Wächter, 2006). In addition, these 
studies made it explicit that subsidiaries of multinational corporations are facing 
institutional pressures from two different sources: the parent company and the local 
environment (Kostova, & Roth, 2002). These dual pressures are not always consistent 
with each other, and the inconsistency between the two forces can be a source of 
variance in the subsidiaries’ behaviors.  
However, these earlier studies have at least two limitations. First, they are 
susceptible to the emerging criticism against the overemphasis on the isomorphism in 
early versions of neoinstitutionalism. Over the recent decade, many institutional 
theorists have pointed out that the earlier formulation of institutional theory is 
incomplete because it underestimated the role of actors in the process of 
institutionalization. Oliver (1991) argued that organizations choose to proactively and 
strategically respond to environmental constraints rather than passively conform to the 
given institutional pressures. More recently, scholars have indicated that institutional 
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pressures, in certain cases, may encourage diversity rather than isomorphism among 
organizations (Lounsbury, 2007).  
Another limitation of the previous research has to do with its primary interest 
in the diffusion of homemade routines and relative ignorance of indigenous practices. 
The transfer of practices that have been proven effective in the home country is an 
important issue in international business research because it can be a source of 
differentiating, and thus building, competitive advantage in local markets. However, 
indigenous practices are not less important in people management practices because 
employment management practices are under the heavy influence of local regulations, 
social norms, and cultures (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). Therefore, the lack of 
attention to subsidiaries’ responses to local employment relations practices is an 
important gap in the literature.    
My study attempts to address the two limitations of the prior studies by 
developing a nuanced understanding of the diverse reactions of subsidiaries toward 
indigenous local industrial relations practices by qualitatively investigating 
multinational companies’ policies on Chinese trade unions. The Chinese trade union is 
an ideal subject of study for two reasons. First, it is a good example of a unique local 
practice of which foreign multinational companies must creatively make sense in order 
to formulate their responses. Unlike the unions in most developed countries where the 
multinational companies originated, Chinese unions are the organs of the national 
Communist Party rather than a representative body of employees. Therefore, 
standardized union policies developed in a parent company do not have direct 
relevancy in its subsidiaries in China. Second, the recent union recognition campaign 
supported by the Chinese government has generated interesting variance in the 
reactions of subsidiaries toward the local practice. This offers great opportunities for 
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researchers to observe the interactions between subsidiaries and their surrounding 
environments within and outside the company.  
The research strategy employed in this study is a deductive investigation based 
on qualitative fieldwork data. Over 100 individuals were interviewed in 11 coastal 
cities of China between June 2007 and July 2008. The fieldwork was conducted in 
three stages. First, exploratory work was conducted in the summer of 2007. In this 
step, I visited five cities searching for major issues surrounding industrial relations in 
China and identifying potential factors that might influence the choices of 
multinational companies in their employment practices. In the second stage, I 
extended my fieldwork so that the sample could include enough variance in identified 
critical determinants of employment relations in the subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies: location of the subsidiaries, employment relations of the 
parent company, country of origin, size, and industry. Third, I additionally 
investigated the subsidiaries of two companies so that the dataset would contain rich 
information that enabled me to compare and contrast employment relations practices 
across subsidiaries of different human resource management strategies in their home 
country. 
One of the interesting findings of my study is that the strategies of subsidiaries 
toward local unions are more diverse and complicated than what business reports often 
have described. The dichotomous distinction between unionized and nonunionized 
firms is almost meaningless because a significant number of subsidiaries choose to 
take the middle road. In addition, unionization of a firm in China does not necessarily 
mean that employees have an institution that advocates for them. Rather, subsidiaries 
are able to effectively control the union in a way to serve the purposes of management.  
Schematically speaking, subsidiaries of multinational firms in China were 
found to adopt one of three behavioral patterns toward local unions: circumvention, 
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ceremonial recognition, and cooptation. Subsidiaries that adopt circumvention avoid 
recognition of any form of unions. Some establishments exert significant efforts to 
maintain a union-free workplace while others simply ignore the union issue. 
Subsidiaries that adopt ceremonial recognition recognize unions only on paper and 
discourage any substantial organized union activity. A growing number of subsidiaries 
have converted their approaches from union-free to ceremonial recognition as the 
unionization campaign has intensified. In establishments where the recognition of 
unions is ceremonial, union leaders are appointed by the management. In many cases, 
union leaders are members of the human resource department.  
To the contrary, establishments that adopt the cooptation approach recognize 
unions and encourage them to organize social activities. Union leaders are chosen 
through general elections among employees. However, the level of activity of unions 
does not necessarily mean that employees have a large voice in the company. Because 
the operations of unions are financially dependent on management, activities of unions 
are always aligned with the interests of the company. Although union leaders are 
selected by the employees, the company maintains the right to nominate the 
candidates. The co-opted unions tend to represent management rather than employees 
in cases such as adverse actions or downsizing.  
Then, what explains this variance in the approaches of multinational firms 
toward unions? Some of my findings were consistent with those in the previous 
literature while others were not. As prior studies have reported, subsidiaries’ reactions 
to local practices were significantly influenced by the two types of isomorphic 
pressures: the isomorphism within the multinational networks and the isomorphic 
force in the local area (Kostova & Roth, 2002). As for the isomorphism within the 
company, multinational companies that do not recognize unions in their home country 
establishments tend to not recognize unions in their local subsidiaries. On the other 
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hand, subsidiaries of multinational companies that are known for cooperative relations 
with unions tend to maintain positive attitudes toward unions. The isomorphic 
pressures in the local areas were observed by the effects of regions with respect to the 
likelihood of recognizing unions. In less developed regions where the union 
recognition rate is low, managers of foreign companies do not feel strong pressure to 
recognize unions. However, in a region where the union recognition rate risen 
dramatically over the past few years, managers are under direct as well as 
psychological pressures to recognize unions.  
What would be even more interesting in my findings is that diverse behavioral 
patterns could be found under similar institutional forces. For example, subsidiaries of 
a multinational company that has maintained a well-established cooperative 
relationship with unions in the home country do not always adopt a welcoming 
approach toward local unions. Conversely, subsidiaries of a company that has been 
known for strong antiunion activities do not always resist recognizing unions in China. 
Then, how this variance can be explained?   
In my fieldwork, I found that managers of foreign-invested firms perceive 
Chinese unions in different ways, and the way subsidiary managers view the Chinese 
union is related to the variance within the same profile of institutional forces.  
Managers’ perceptions about the nature of unions can be broken into three 
categories: potential threat, social lubricant, and inert substance. Some managers 
consider Chinese unions to be a potential threat to the foreign firms, others perceive 
unions as a social lubricant between foreigners and locals, and still others believe 
unions are simply the inert remnants of the old planned economy that do not play any 
significant role for or against the company.  
The differences in the perceived nature of unions are associated with the 
perception about the relationship between unions and the government. Even managers 
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of two extreme perspectives, the potential threat and the social lubricant, generally 
agree that the trade union in China is a governmental organ. But, they have opposing 
views on what the close relationship between unions and the government suggests. For 
those who regard unions as a threat, the close relationship between unions and the 
government is viewed as a source of managerial uncertainty because it may extend the 
influence of local government into the company. For those who regard unions as a 
lubricant, unions are considered to be a channel for communication with the 
government so that they may reduce the managerial uncertainty in a country where the 
government maintains a strong influence on the economy. And, those who consider 
unions as inert substances do not find any expected benefits or costs in the link 
between unions and the government. 
The differences in the perceived nature of unions are also related to the 
perceived role of unions within the company. For those who regard unions as social 
lubricants, unions are considered to be a source of harmony in the company. 
Traditionally, the main role of unions in China is to organize social events and arrange 
training sessions in which managerial policies are delivered. This role had been 
defined as a “transmission belt” that smoothed the turnaround of a planned economy. 
Although economic liberation weakened the direct impact of centrally planned 
production plans on the management of companies, the legacy of unions as a 
transmission belt remains. Managers of foreign companies who view unions as a 
social lubricant imagine that the legacy of unions in China can be revitalized in a way 
to facilitate the communication between foreign managers and local employees. By 
supporting unions to organize social events, multinational companies can enhance a 
cooperative atmosphere between foreign expatriates and local workers. By designating 
unions as a channel for employees to express their voices, multinational companies 
can avoid a situation where unvented employee frustrations develop into wild strikes.   
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However, for those who regard unions as a threat, unions in China are 
considered to be an organization of local employees that might initiate collective 
action against foreign managers. Although this concern is supported by 
unsubstantiated fears rather than by the empirical evidence, many managers of 
foreign-owned firms have a strong belief that unions in China will deepen the 
psychological gap between foreign supervisors and local employees. In addition, for 
those who treat unions as an insignificant legacy of the past, unions are considered to 
have no capability, or even motivation, to work for or against management. 
I found that the three cognitive frames of unions (social lubricant, potential 
threat, and inert substance) are associated with the three behavioral patterns toward 
unions (cooptation, circumvention, and ceremonial recognition). At first sight, each 
type of perception has its own match. For example, the perception of social lubricant 
seems to have a natural fit with the cooptation approach, and the perception of 
potential threat seems to be matched with the circumvention approach. It is interesting, 
however, that the three cognitive frames of unions do not match one-by-one with the 
subsidiaries’ three behavioral patterns toward unions. The similar behavioral pattern 
was driven by different cognitive frames.  
This is most clearly shown among the subsidiaries that adopt the ceremonial 
approach. In some cases, subsidiaries maintain the paper unions with the belief that 
unions have no more value except as a symbol of compliance to the external 
stakeholders. In other cases, subsidiaries adopt unions ceremonially despite the belief 
of managers that unions have great potential to function as a social lubricant. With 
respect to this discrepancy, I found that the institutional and organizational factors 
jointly influence the linkages between the images of unions and the behavioral 
patterns toward them. Even if expatriate managers believe that the union is potentially 
detrimental to the company, subsidiaries were found to adopt the union at least 
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ceremonially (rather than circumventing it) when institutional isomorphism toward 
unionization is sound or organizational characteristics strongly require intermediary 
employee representatives. Conversely, even if expatriate managers believe that the 
union is beneficial to the company, subsidiaries were found to reject the union or only 
ceremonially adopt it when the institutional pressure for a union-free workplace is 
strong or the organizational structure is too simple to justify an additional investment 
in developing employee communication channels.  
 
What Do Unions and Training Investment Do for Multinational Corporations? 
 
The consequences of employment relations and human resource practices in 
the context of multinational corporations operating in the emerging economy of China 
are addressed in chapter 4. This study confronts that issue by analyzing a quantitative 
dataset on Chinese companies in the manufacturing sector. The major concern of the 
study is whether unions and employer-provided training affect firm performance 
differently depending on the ownership structure.  
In this chapter, I attempt to provide evidence that support two arguments. The 
first argument is that recognizing unions in China is more beneficial for foreign than 
domestic firms because it reduces the problem of deficient legitimacy in the local 
market. The second argument is that the positive impact of employer-provided training 
on firm performance is stronger in foreign-owned firms than in domestic firms in 
China because foreign companies, unlike domestic firms, can expect an additional 
benefit of training: the cross-border knowledge inflow.  
The first argument extends the existing discussion of the organizational 
consequences of unions. While previous research on this subject has focused on 
unions in mature market economies, my study provides new insights to the literature 
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about “what do unions do?”(Freeman & Medoff, 1984) by investigating the issue in 
the context of the emerging economy of China. The present study also offers a new 
way to see the organizational consequences of unions by introducing sociological 
perspectives instead of the perspectives of economics that were primarily employed in 
prior studies. In addition, this argument has significant practical implications because 
foreign multinational companies in China are seeking an answer to the question of 
whether they should or should not recognize unions in the face of an intensifying 
government-supported unionization campaign.  
The second argument adds to the existing knowledge about the relationship 
between employer-provided training and firm performance. Transaction cost theory 
and a resource-based view of the firm as well as human capital theory have commonly 
suggested that assuring firm-specific human capital is necessary for a firm to develop 
a sustainable competitive advantage in the market (Barney, 1991). Based on these 
perspectives, employer-provided training has been recognized as an important source 
of competitive advantage because it promotes the firm specificity of human capital. By 
definition, firm-specific human capital cannot be obtained from the external labor 
market. The labor market is supposed to supply a workforce with general skills that 
can be utilized by many companies including competitors. A training program 
designed to serve specific needs of an employer is the major instrument to develop 
employees’ skills and knowledge that have exclusive value to the firm. In this regard, 
employer-provided training is presumed to contribute to the firm’s performance. 
Despite the well-established relationship between employer-provided training 
and firm performance put forth in the literature, managers of foreign-owned firms in 
the emerging economy of China are often skeptical about the efficacy of investing in 
human capital development. In China, labor mobility is very high. Skilled workers are 
often offered better job opportunities by competing foreign employers. Due to the 
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serious labor shortage in the skilled labor market, employers find it difficult to retain 
employees who received a significant amount of company-provided training. More 
often than not, employees of companies that are known for their well-organized 
training programs are targeted by staff-searching firms. This tendency is especially 
prevalent in foreign-invested sectors. What this situation suggests is that the positive 
relation between training investment and firm performance might not be as strong as 
was demonstrated in other mature market economies, especially for foreign 
multinational firms.  
The data used in this study was originally collected by the National Statistical 
Bureau of China in 2004. One of the great merits of this dataset is that this is the only 
national dataset that contains union variables. The original dataset contains all 
registered manufacturing firms in China. From this dataset, I excluded firms where the 
majority of ownership belongs to the Chinese government because these companies 
may operate under an institutional environment that differs from other domestic firms. 
I also excluded firms owned by investors from greater China regions, such as Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Macao, because the institutional dynamics of these firms might be 
unlike those of other Chinese domestic firms or purely foreign companies. Firm 
performance was measured by the return on equity. Union recognition was coded from 
the reported number of union members. Training investment was calculated as the 
education expenditure per employee.  
The results of the regression analyses generally supported the hypotheses. 
Unions showed a moderately positive impact on firm performance in foreign-owned 
firms, but a clearly negative impact on firm performance in domestic private firms. 
Training investment showed a positive impact on firm performance regardless of the 
ownership type, although the impact was stronger in foreign-owned firms.  
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The organization of the remainder of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 
points out the limitations of existing SHRM literature and demonstrates the potential 
contributions of institutional perspectives using China as an example. Chapter 3 
qualitatively examines the institutional and organizational determinants of industrial 
relations practices of multinational corporations in China. Chapter 4 provides 
quantitative evidence that unions and training investment bring positive organizational 
consequences for foreign-owned firms in China. The final chapter provides 
conclusions and discusses future research directions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PUTTING STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN 
CONTEXT: LESSONS FROM CHINA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Strategic human resource management (SHRM) has emerged as a field of 
scholarly inquiry in the United States over the past 30 years. Facing unprecedented 
global competition, managers in the United States came to recognize that carefully 
designed human resource management (HRM) can be a major driver of organizational 
performance. A number of studies have empirically demonstrated that HRM practices 
or a bundle of practices significantly affect organizational outcomes (Delery & Dotty, 
1996; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995). More recently, researchers have attempted to 
provide rigorous theoretical explanations for the causal link between human resource 
(HR) systems and firm performance (Batt, 2002; Collins & Clark, 2003; Evans & 
Davis, 2005).  
It is debatable whether the field of SHRM has provided a body of knowledge 
that is equally relevant beyond its birthplace. Some authors have conceded that the 
universality implicit in the U.S.-based SHRM literature has widespread applicability 
and have claimed that “there is no a priori reason to believe [italics added] (Bjorkman 
& Fan, 2002, p. 854)” that the prior SHRM models will not work in other countries. 
Assuming “the transferability of the Western hypothesis of a relationship between 
strategic HRM and organizational performance” (Zhu, Thomson, & DeCieri, 2008, p. 
143), several researchers have succeeded in offering initial evidence for the 
replicability of U.S.-based findings in Asian Pacific countries (Bae & Lawler, 2000; 
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Bjorkman & Fan, 2002; Guthrie, 2001; Sun, Aryee, & Law, 2007; Takeuchi, Lepak, 
Wang, & Takeuchi, 2007).  
However, others have argued that SHRM is one of the “made-in-the-U.S.” 
fields of study that are biased toward institutional and cultural contexts of the United 
States (Boseli, Paauwe, & Richardson, 2003; Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 
1980; Shenkar & Von Glinow, 1994). Examining HRM in the Netherlands, Boseli and 
his colleagues concluded that the explanatory power of U.S.-based SHRM models is 
limited in countries with the so-called Rhineland model of industrial relations (Boseli 
& Richardson, 2001; Boseli et al., 2003; Paauwe & Boseli, 2003). They stated that 
“much of the existing HR literature is unnecessarily narrow and that far more attention 
needs to be paid to institutional contexts” (Boseli, Paauwe, & Jansen, 2001, p. 1088). 
This paper intends to remind HRM researchers that current major theories of 
SHRM are significantly influenced by the institutional environments of the United 
States. Although SHRM can encompass a wide range of topics associated with 
antecedents as well as consequences of HR systems (Wright & McMahan, 1992), I 
focus on the primary concern of the field: the relationship between HR systems and 
firm performance. Drawing from literatures of national business systems, institutional 
theories, and cross-cultural studies, I argue that the mainstream SHRM research is 
framed by biased assumptions that reflect the regulatory, normative, and cultural 
environments of the liberal market economy of the United States. Therefore, existing 
major tenets of SHRM should not be automatically taken as context-free theories with 
global relevancy. In addition, I propose that the explicit consideration of contextual 
variables (particularly, those of national contingency) will provide opportunities to 
answer the central questions of SHRM in a new way.  
The paper will contextualize the U.S.-based SHRM research by comparing 
institutional environments around HRM between the United States and the People’s 
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Republic of China. My choice of China as a comparative case is justified in the first 
section of the paper. Next, I will discuss how the regulatory, normative, and cultural 
environments of the U.S. economy have shaped the previous SHRM research, and 
why the global relevancy of the literature should not be taken for granted. Finally, I 
will provide reflections and suggestions on how the contextualized understanding of 
the literature can contribute to resolving and reframing two central concerns of SHRM 
research: (a) the existence of universally effective HR systems and (b) the hidden 
causal link between HR systems and firm performance. 
 
Why Compare the United States and China? 
 
There are several compelling reasons why it is important and useful to examine 
China as a benchmark case for evaluating the existing SHRM research. First, China 
has the largest number of employees of any country in the world. Therefore, theories 
about people management cannot claim universal validity unless they can effectively 
explain the phenomena in China (Shenkar & Von Glinow, 1994).  
Second, China is quite different from Western developed countries in its 
regulatory, normative, and cultural environments. I admit that China is not the only 
nation where these dimensions differ from those of the United States. For example, 
continental European countries such as Germany can be used as comparative cases for 
the dissimilarity in national business systems (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Yet, not many 
places other than China offer the opportunity to examine the impact of the regulatory, 
normative, and cultural environments simultaneously. In other words, China is an 
ideal “research laboratory” to test the relevance of existing SHRM research developed 
in the U.S. context (Shenkar & Von Glinow, 1994). 
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Third, the recent burgeoning of HRM research in China requires a systematic 
understanding of the institutional differences between the United States and China. A 
recent comprehensive review (Zhu et al., 2008) reported that the number of published 
academic studies on Chinese HRM has grown from 5 between 1979 and 1984 to 98 
between 2000 and 2005. The number of studies that specifically look at HR and firm 
performance relations in Chinese companies is also rapidly growing. My review of the 
10 major academic outlets1 between 1992 and 2008 revealed that 17 papers have 
specifically investigated the empirical relations between HR and firm performance of 
Chinese companies (see the article summaries in the Table 1.1). In the same period, 
probably no country other than the United States would have received as much 
attention from HR researchers. Despite the growing number of studies, however, 
China-based SHRM research has provided few theoretical contributions to the global 
SHRM literature. Part of the reason for this lack of theoretical contributions is that  
researchers of Chinese HRM have tended to uncritically assume the universal 
applicability of U.S.-based theories and focus only on replicating those findings in 
China. When researchers encountered unexpected findings, many simply employed 
the convenient concept of cultural difference without specifying how the cross-
national difference caused the counterintuitive results in their Chinese sample. This is 
unfortunate because these researchers lost excellent opportunities to further contribute 
to the global knowledge of SHRM. By contextualizing U.S.-based studies, this paper 
hopes to assist future China-based SHRM studies to formulate new questions and 
identify better explanations for novel empirical findings. 
                                                 
1 The ten journals reviewed include: Academy of Management Journal, Organization 
Science, Strategic Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of 
International Business Studies, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Organization 
Studies, Management International Review, Human Resource Management, and 
International Journal of Human Resource Management. 
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Table 1.1 
Empirical studies on HR-firm performance in China that appeared in major English 
journals (1992-2008 January) 
Citation Major Findings 
Wei, & Lau, (JIBS, in 
press) SHRM has significant positive relations with firm performance measures 
Akhta, Ding, & Ge, 
(HRM, 2008) 
Strategic HRM practices affects both financial and product/service performance. 
Employment security and job descriptions contributed uniquely to product/service 
performance, whereas profit sharing contributed uniquely to financial performance 
Ngo, Lau, Foley, 
(HRM 2008) HRM and SHRM (independently) positively affect firm performance 
Li, Lam, Sun,  
Liu(SMJ, 2008) 
Internal employment mode positively associated with firm performance(profit and 
market share) 
Sun, Aryee, Law(AMJ, 
2007) HPWP significantly increase OCB, and OCB reduces turnover 
Zheng, Morrison, 
O'Neill (IJHRM, 2006) 
Motivation factors(perf based pay & participatory decision making) + / Social 
Benefits Factor (provision of social security scheme & substantial trade union) -  
Lee, Hsu, Lien 
(IJHRM, 2006) 
Retirement and pension plans reduces the turnover while severance pay increase the 
turnover rate 
Gong, Shenkar,  Luo, 
Nyaw (JIBS, 2005) 
HR problems on parent-subsidiary relations have direct positive impact on IJV 
performance, but it also reduces the effectiveness of within IJV HRM which leads to 
lower performance. 
Ng and Siu (IJHRM, 
2004) 
managerial training has a significant and positive impact on performance/ # of 
technician has a positive impact on performance (in SOEs)/# of managerial workers 
has a positive impact on performance (in Non-SOEs) 
Li, Ji (IJHRM, 2003) Long-term oriented HR reduces turnover/Proportion of University graduate increase productivity/Pay level reduces turnover and increase ROA 
Bae, Chen, Wan, 
Lawler, Walumbwa  
(IJHRM, 2003) 
HPWP works across different nations/ HPWP works better for indigenous firms than 
foreign firms/ the effect of HPWP is not significant for European firms  
Law, Tse, Zhou (JIBS, 
2003) 
In JV, role of HR has a positive significant correlation with ROE; in Shared stock 
firms, role of HR is significantly correlated with ROE and Productivity  
Takeuchi, 
Wakabayashi, 
Chen(APIJ, 2003) 
Japanese type of HR practices positive affect financial performance, but not 
behavioral outcomes(turnover/absenteeism) 
Bjorkman,& Fan 
(IJHRM, 2002) 
HPWP significantly increase firm performance/HR-Strategy alignment signficantly 
improve firm performance 
Wai-Kwong, Priem, & 
Cycyota (IJHRM, 
2001) 
HR manager involvement during strategy making was positively related to 
perceptions of future business performance. Pursuit of a cost leadership strategy, 
combined with either high HR manager involvement or high middle manager 
involvement, produced high business performance. 
Glover, L. & Siu 
(IJHRM, 2000) 
Low wages, lack of training, and lack of career planning undermine the product 
quality 
Ngo, Turban, Lau, & 
Lui (IJHRM, 1998) 
Training, Performance based pay, Diversity increasing practice are positively 
associated with firm performance 
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Finally, testing the relevance of the existing SHRM literature by using the 
Chinese case has a practical importance. China has attracted the largest number of 
foreign multinational firms in recent years (Huang, 2003). Thus, there is an enormous 
need for managers of multinational companies to know whether they can apply the 
propositions of the existing SHRM literature to Chinese subsidiaries in the same way 
that they do in their countries of origin.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND STRATEGIC HUMAN 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
 
This paper does not intend to challenge the internal validity of the major 
existing SHRM studies. Rather, I attempt to identify the boundary conditions of the 
mainstream SHRM research and question the external validity of the existing findings. 
Specifically, I argue that current SHRM is significantly biased toward U.S. 
institutional environments in which the major theoretical development has been 
occurring. Therefore, the universal applicability of the SHRM model should be very 
carefully assumed.  
To systematically examine how U.S. institutional environments have shaped 
the current SHRM research, I employ Scott’s (2008) three pillars framework that is 
composed of regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements. The regulatory 
aspect of an institutional environment is constituted by laws and rules of a nation that 
constrain or promote certain types of behaviors. The normative component involves 
values and norms held by a society. The normative environment specifies the socially 
appropriate behaviors of members. The cultural-cognitive pillar has to do with the 
ways in which members of a society make sense of the world around them. Using the 
three pillars framework, I will depict institutional profiles of the United States and 
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China with regard to a specific issue of SHRM and discuss how the mainstream 
SHRM research is influenced by regulatory, normative, and cultural arrangements of 
the U.S. liberal market economy.  
 
The Regulatory Environment: Is This a Negligible Issue? 
 
The mainstream SHRM literature presumes that top management can 
autonomously design and implement HR systems according to the strategic need of a 
company without much consideration of regulatory constraints. The popular “dual fit 
model” of SHRM is an illustrative example in point. According to Baird and 
Meshoulam (1988), companies are expected to achieve high performance when the 
management implements a set of coherent HR practices (horizontal fit) that is well 
aligned with firm’s strategies (vertical fit). The assumption behind this argument is 
that management can freely choose or adjust major aspects of HR practices according 
to their strategic intentions without considering any regulatory constraints.  
Lepak and Snell’s (1999) HR architecture model and its extensions (e.g., Kang, 
Morris, & Snell, 2007) are another popularized SHRM theory that assumes a wide 
range of managerial autonomy in designing HR systems. According to this theoretical 
model and extensions, companies are described as independent entities that can 
unilaterally adjust HR composition according to their managers’ judgments about the 
value and uniqueness of employees. Without considering any regulatory constraints on 
hiring and firing practices, these authors recommended that firms externalize less 
valuable and replaceable individuals while maintaining long-term relationships with 
core employees.  
The assumption of complete managerial autonomy and the lack of attention to 
labor market legislation in the mainstream SHRM literature may reflect the regulatory 
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environment of the liberal market economy. Theorists of national business systems 
(e.g., Hall & Soskice, 2001) have suggested that, in liberal market economies such as 
the United States, companies enjoy an extensive degree of autonomy when it comes to 
HR and industrial relations practices. In liberal market economies, the labor market, 
rather than regulations or collective representatives, dominates the relationship 
between companies and individual employees. Companies generally enjoy a 
substantial amount of freedom in hiring and firing decisions. Firms are not obliged to 
recognize unions and can unilaterally control employees. Except with regard to certain 
issues such as government-sanctioned affirmative action programs, dealing with the 
regulatory environment is considered to be an administrative task that does not add 
much value to the firm. Reflecting this regulatory environment, U.S.-based SHRM 
research has tended to neglect the element of the regulatory context and describe 
corporations as autonomous entities that design and implement HR systems according 
to their strategic needs. 
However, the assumption of complete managerial autonomy may not hold in 
China. Even after decades of ambitious marketization and economic liberation 
programs, the Chinese government still maintains a significant influence in the 
Chinese economy, and Chinese companies do not enjoy the kind of freedom to hire 
and fire of their U.S. counterparts. Even the branches of foreign firms, which are 
believed to have the largest degree of autonomy in China, must recruit, at least 
officially, through government-run HR services such as FESCO (interview, Beijing, 
10 July 2008). In fact, Chinese labor regulations are becoming increasingly, rather 
than decreasingly, restrictive. The Chinese labor law enacted in 2008 clearly illustrates 
the trend. For instance, the new law stipulates that companies are not allowed the 
freedom to fire employees who have worked for the firm for more than 10 years. 
Unions or local labor authorities are to be consulted about layoff decisions. Temporary 
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workers must be able to easily obtain job security. Furthermore, the new labor law 
also specifies that companies have to provide mandatory severance pay. In sum, the 
newly introduced law intends to constrain companies’ autonomy in hiring and firing. 
In addition to these increasingly restrictive elements, the transitional nature of 
Chinese regulatory systems poses an additional layer of problems on HRM. In the case 
of the United States, the regulatory environment is relatively stable and predictable. 
The interpretation of labor laws is generally less contestable than that of emerging 
economies. Therefore, neglecting the regulatory environment, or assuming it as 
“given,” may not create a serious gap between theories and the realities in the U.S. 
context. However, in the transition economy of China, regulation is not simply a given 
condition. Rather, it is an issue to be strategically managed. Chinese HR managers are 
attentive to the regulatory environment not only to comply with it, but also to 
proactively manage it.  
The observations made in my fieldwork confirmed that companies in China, 
especially those originated from foreign countries take the regulatory environment into 
consideration very seriously. Managers considered maintaining intimate personal 
relationships, or develop a high level of “guanxi” with local law enforcement 
authorities is one of their critical concerns. In an interview, a CEO of a Korean 
company in a Northern coastal city confessed that he regularly treat local law 
enforcement authorities with expensive dinner and stunning gifts. He said this is 
necessary because the company will suffer a high degree of uncertainty with respect to 
law enforcement without concrete support of the "friendly" officials (interview, 26 
May 2008, Qingdao). In another interview, a human resource manager of an European 
energy company stated that the company maintains the headquarter office in the most 
expensive area of Beijing not because it enhances the efficiency of managing othe 
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Chinese subsidiaries, but because the location is close to important governmental 
offices (interview, 21 Dec. 2006, Beijing) 
Three unique characteristics of the Chinese labor law systems contribute to this 
phenomenon. First, Chinese labor regulation systems are continuously changing. The 
Chinese government has introduced multiple major labor regulations over the past 20 
years in order to meet the challenges accompanied by dramatic economic development 
(Lee, Lee, Kim, & Yoon, 2008). The new labor law enacted by the Chinese 
government in 2008 superseded the prior labor law of 1994. Between the enactments 
of these two major labor laws, regulations on unions (2001), a collective contract law 
(2004), and minimum wage regulations (2004) were newly introduced or revised. 
Because labor regulations are evolving, Chinese firms must invest resources to 
monitor and interpret new information in regulatory updates, and adjust their HR 
systems accordingly.  
Second, there is a significant difference between the written laws and their 
enforcement. In many cases, Chinese labor law does not clearly specify the sanctions 
against offenders. Sometimes, local regulations are not totally consistent with the 
national law. Therefore, legal compliance often involves negotiations with relevant 
stakeholders (Athreya, 2004). For example, the current labor law specifically 
stipulates that employees cannot work more than 36 hours of overtime in a month. 
However, the Chinese government is quite flexible in enforcing this law. In many 
manufacturing facilities, a mutual understanding among the employer, employees, and 
local authorities allows employees to work more than 60 hours of overtime in a month. 
The severity of punishment for employers on this violation depends on the formal or 
informal terms of negotiation with employees and local authorities. Therefore, the 
activities of dealing with the regulatory environment have “strategic value” to Chinese 
firms. 
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Third, in China, there is a significant within-country variance in the regulatory 
environment. One of the variables that may capture this within-country variance is 
ownership type (Gallagher, 2005). For example, state-owned firms are generally under 
stronger regulatory controls than other types of firms in terms of employment 
relations. In return, state-owned firms enjoy better protection in the domestic market. 
Alternatively, foreign-owned firms have been endowed with a set of favorable 
regulatory measures at the same time as they are under heavier pressure of legal 
compliance than domestic firms. Another variable that may indicate the difference in 
the regulatory environment is geographical region (Cheng & Kwan, 2000). The 
regulatory environment between China’s industrialized eastern coastal cities with a 
long history of economic liberation is quite different from that of its recently emerging 
inner cities.  
The influence of the regulatory environment on the relation of HR systems and 
firm performance is also empirically shown to be significant in some of recent China-
based SHRM studies. Law, Tse, and Zhou (2003) found positive and significant 
correlations between the strategic role of HR systems and firm performance in joint 
venture and shared enterprises, but the correlations were not significant in state-owned 
and collectively owned firms. In a similar vein, Ng and Siu (2004) investigated how 
employer-provided training affected firm performance differently between state-
owned and non-state-owned companies. They found that the positive relationship 
between training and firm performance was more clearly seen in the non-state-owned 
sector. More recently, Ngo, Lau, and Foley (2008) determined that the adoption of 
sophisticated HRM practices was negatively associated with financial performance in 
private-owned firms. Wei and Lau (in press) suggested that the alignment of HRM 
with firm strategy was more strongly associated with firm performance in foreign-
invested firms than in other types of ownerships. Although these studies did not 
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elaborate on the exact mechanisms through which the regulatory environment affects 
the relation of HR systems and firm performance, the empirical results clearly showed 
that the regulatory environment does matter in the Chinese context. 
 
The Normative Environment: Do U.S. and Chinese Human Resource Managers 
Share the Same Understanding of Strategic Human Resource Management?  
 
The growth of SHRM as an independent field of study in the United States has 
been accompanied by the evolution of HRM as a professional occupation over more 
than a half century. In contrast, HRM in China is a recently imported concept that is 
part of the ongoing institutionalization process. In this section, I will briefly 
summarize how HRM has historically developed and been institutionalized in the 
United States and China, and then discuss its implications for the relation of HR 
systems and firm performance.  
Before 1980, personnel management, which was later replaced by HRM, 
represented a collection of administrative activities such as recruiting, selection, 
training, compensation, and handing industrial relations (Dyer & Burdick, 1998). In 
this pre-SHRM period, the major roles of a personnel management department were to 
conduct administrative works, monitor legal compliance, deal with collective 
bargaining, and preempt unionization. Although the employee advocate role was not 
neglected, the personnel management department had developed with independent 
functions that distinguished it from labor relations activities (Dyer & Burdick, 1998). 
After World War II, some personnel managers began to consider themselves as 
professionals who could contribute to employee welfare and organizational 
performance. However, others regarded the personal department as a “trash can” for 
duties that no other department wanted to be assigned such as factory security, 
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firefighting services, and the reception desk (Ritzer & Trice, 1969). In this period, 
industrial relations research dominated the field while behavioral science theories, 
which had inherited the traditions of the human relations school, provided systematic 
knowledge on motivation, leadership, and group dynamics (Dyer & Burdick, 1998).  
During the 1980s, the U.S. economy faced unprecedented global competition. 
The old mass production model was viewed as irrelevant and obsolete in the rapidly 
globalizing economy. The upheaval of the U.S. economy forced companies to rethink 
their operations across all major functions including HRM. Some companies reduced 
the number of employees through massive layoffs and firings. Others experimented 
with new sets of production systems referred to as high-performance work systems 
(HPWSs) or high-involvement work systems (Appelbaum & Batt, 1994). The 
declining influence of unions was another notable phenomenon that promoted new 
understanding about the role of HR. 
Facing these challenges and changes, HR professionals strived to be 
recognized as a profit center rather than a cost factor within their organization (Dyer & 
Burdick, 1998). On the one hand, HR managers promoted their expertise on the 
technical aspects of HRM. Professional associations distributed “human resource best 
practices” through conferences, publications, and certification exams (Wiely, 1995). 
Academic research provided concrete knowledge on various functional areas of HR. 
Consequently, in the early 1990s, the technical knowledge on HRM activities had 
become so widely institutionalized that it was “inadequate as a means of 
differentiating from competitors” (Huselid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997, p. 184).  
On the other hand, HR managers began to claim that the integration of HRM 
and firm strategies would result in a superior firm performance. The role that Ulrich 
(1997) called “strategic partner” has emerged as an ideal image for HR professionals. 
Although other roles such as employee advocate and administrative expert were also 
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considered important, professional associations and consulting firms promoted the 
concept that the strategic partner is the ultimate role for HR professionals (Booth, 
2001; Marshall & Whelan, 1996). In the handbook for HR professional certification, 
for instance, the Society for Human Resource Management claimed that the major role 
of HR is to monitor, control, and rearrange every aspect of people management 
including industrial relations “in support of the organization’s strategic goals, 
objectives, and values” (HR Certification Institute, 2008).  
Responding to the practitioners’ needs, researchers have developed theoretical 
and empirical justification for value added aspects of HRM. The organizational 
consequences of HR systems, rather than individual practices, have become a defining 
characteristic of SHRM research (Wright & McMahan, 1992). As a result, the positive 
relationship between sophisticated HR systems and firm performance has come to be 
supported by a good deal of academic research (Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, & Allen, 
2005). 
In the transitional economy of China today, the professional and academic 
community of HRM is still in its formative stage. The marketization of the economy 
through the years has generated a notable variance in the expected role of HRM 
(Wang, Bruning, & Peng, 2007). In the centrally planned Chinese economy of the pre-
reformed era, employee or labor management was considered a type of administrative 
function to be mechanically implemented according to the guidance of the Communist 
government (Warner, 1993). Personnel management in this era was often represented 
with the expression of “iron rice bowl.” This system was characterized by lifelong 
employment with few practices aimed at individual-based motivation. As the 
economic reformation proceeded, however, the Chinese government came to consider 
this traditional method of managing people as a source of inefficiency. Therefore, the 
government initiated reformation programs in early 1990s that gradually allowed 
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company managers to have autonomy in hiring and firing decisions (Ding, Goodall, & 
Warner, 2000; Ding & Warner, 2001).  
In addition, with the lowering of competitive barriers and ensuing movement 
of large multinational firms into China through either joint ventures or wholly owned 
subsidiaries, the so-called “Western-style” HRM was introduced by foreigners and 
gained legitimacy among Chinese managers, partly through the newly established 
business schools and emerging consulting industry (Ding et al., 2000). The expression 
renli ziyuan (human resource management) was a quite novel and rarely used concept 
in early 1990s, but it has become a common Chinese business term in the 2000s (Zhu, 
Cooper, De Cieri, & Dowling, 2005). Some companies, especially those privately 
owned, quickly embraced the idea of HRM either because their managers believed it 
would promote the firm’s performance in the marketized economy or because it 
suddenly became a legitimate concept (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  
However, the change, although fast and far-reaching, should not be overstated. 
The majority of Chinese companies, particularly state-owned firms that still constitute 
a sizable portion of the economy, have been slow to follow the trend and even now 
maintain many aspects of the traditional methods of personnel management (Ding et 
al., 2000). Some state-owned firms are required to contribute to the society by offering 
employment security and extensive benefits regardless of their market performance. 
Studies have shown that the old, socialist welfare type of employment system is hardly 
dying and is being actively regenerated in newly established firms (Francis, 1996; 
Warner, 1999). For many companies, basic elements of HR systems such as recruiting 
and variable pay remain novel practices yet to be internalized. Therefore, only a small 
fraction of Chinese companies have HR managers whose technical capabilities are on 
a level similar to their U.S. counterparts (Mitsuhashi, Park, Wright, & Chua, 2000).  
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The resurgence of Chinese trade unions may further complicate the normative 
environment of HRM. In response to the growing number of labor disputes in 
industrialized regions, the Chinese government is promoting the employee 
representative role of trade unions (Clarke, Lee, & Li, 2004). According to the 
corporatist tradition of China, the grassroots union leadership is often held by HR 
managers, and it is also closely connected to government authorities (Gallagher, 2005; 
Tsui & Carver, 2006). Although the current Chinese labor union is cooperative rather 
than antagonistic toward management, the social norms and political pressures 
summarized in the expression of “harmonious society” may increase the need for HR 
managers to assume the role of “employee advocate”(Ulrich, 1997).  
The cross-national differences in the historical development of HRM, degrees 
of institutionalization of HRM, and the expected roles of HR managers may make 
subtle, but important, differences in the relation of HR systems and firm performance. 
First, dissimilarities in the socially constructed meaning of an HR practice can foster 
differences in the relation between the practice and organizational outcomes (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967). Studies have shown that organizations that adopt a socially 
desirable HR practice may increase firm performance (Perry-Smith & Blum, 2000), 
while companies that adopt a socially condemned practice may suffer negative 
consequences such as a bad reputation (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 20012 ). Where an 
HR practice is considered to be a progressive activity in one society but is perceived as 
being regressive in other country, the relationship between the practice and firm 
performance differs accordingly.  
                                                 
2 Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001) demonstrated that the permanent employment 
practice is considered to be a normatively appropriate practice in Japan. Therefore, the 
press and public opinion have punished companies that dismissed employees without 
extensive efforts to avoid the option. 
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Employment security can be a case in point. In the U.S. context, progressive 
HR systems were introduced as an alternative method for the control-oriented 
Tayloristic mass production model (Appelbaum & Batt, 1994). Manufacturers in the 
United States realized that the old system might fail them in the face of cost-effective 
competitors and quality conscious customers. Therefore, a new manufacturing system 
with the dual capability of cost containment and quality improvement was required. 
Many companies found a hope in the HPWS that enables nonmanagerial employees to 
provide discretionary effort and share constructive ideas. In creating an environment 
where workers do not have to worry about losing their jobs when offering suggestions 
and ideas, the HPWS includes an element of employment security. Therefore, 
provision of employment security is often considered to be a part of progressive HR 
systems (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; Batt, 2002; Delery & Doty, 
1996; Huslid, 1995; McDuffie, 1995).  
Ironically, however, HR systems centered on job security are strongly 
associated with “old and inefficient,” rather than progressive, employment systems in 
China. In the context of the transitional economy, innovation in work systems is 
equated with a departure from the traditional social welfare model (Filatotchev, 
Demina, & Wright, 2003). And, the most prominent feature of the traditional model is 
lifelong employment. Therefore, the job security is associated with the old and 
inefficient model of personnel management. A human resource manager of Chinese 
state owned firms told me that “we let poor performers leave the company as GE does 
because it is the way a good company should go (Beijing, 13 July 2008)  
A recent inductive study (Xiao & Bjorkman, 2001) also showed that Chinese 
managers and employees do not associate long term oriented HR practices such as job 
security with “high commitment work systems.” This is an important issue because 
employees infer the values and goals of their company through the nature of HR 
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practices (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Perry-Smith & Blum, 2000; Weick, 1985). If job 
security is strongly associated with a regressive instead of a progressive HR system, 
Chinese companies may find it difficult to create an image of advanced organization 
by offering employment security.  
Second, the level of the technical knowledge of HRM among HR managers 
may affect the pattern of the relation between HR systems and firm performance. In 
countries, regions, or economic sectors where HR managers generally have a low level 
of functional expertise, efforts to integrate HRM and firm strategy may not result in a 
significant level of performance improvement. In this context, HRM practices that 
focus on technical effectiveness may show a significant impact on firm performance. 
Reporting that SHRM, not the technically oriented HRM, does contribute to firm 
performance of U.S. companies, Huselid, Jackson, and Schuler (1997) commented 
that: 
 
“This conclusion may not generalize, however, to smaller U.S. firms and to 
firms competing in environments characterized by lower levels of institutionalization 
for technical HRM activities. . . . Furthermore, if firms in such contexts have not yet 
achieved at least moderate levels of technical HRM effectiveness, they may not have 
the foundation needed to successfully implement strategic HRM activities” (pp. 184–
185). 
 
In China, the technical knowledge of human resource managers about their job 
is in its formative stage. During my fieldwork in China, I encountered several 
occasions that indicate that human resource management is still a new concept in the 
country. For example, I was once asked to offer a lecture on strategic human resource 
management to the whole human resource management department of a Shanghai 
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based textile company in mid July 2006. After the lecture, one of the feedbacks that I 
received from many participants was that the lecture was useful but not as much 
relevant as it sounds because they are still struggling to introduce many basic 
functions of human resource management such as incentive pay.     
Although not many academic studies have explored this issue in an empirical 
setting, Glover and Siu’s (2000) qualitative study on foreign-invested firms operating 
in Shenzhen is informative. Despite the common belief that foreign-invested firms 
located in the industrialized coastal region of China are eager to adopt sophisticated 
HRM practices, Glover and Siu found that their case companies were experiencing a 
significant performance loss due to poorly organized training, compensation, and 
career planning practices. Comparing the poorly designed HR systems of the Chinese 
firms with the scientific management technique of U.S. companies during the  
industrialization era, Glover and Siu suggested that developing “appropriate” practices 
of recruitment, training, development, and reward systems will significantly increase 
the firm performance in Chinese context.  
 
The Cultural Environment: Do Human Resource Systems Affect Firm 
Performance in the Same Way Across Nations? 
 
The causal mechanism through which HR practices affect organizational 
outcome is a research subject that is receiving increased attention. The current 
research in SHRM “is theoretically undeveloped and has not specified the mediating 
employee behaviors that explain the relationship between HR practices and 
performance” (Batt, 2002, p. 587). The missing link between HR systems and firm 
performance, or the so-called “black box” of SHRM, has been deemed an important 
research topic to be addressed by further academic efforts (Collins & Clark, 2003). 
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Answering this call, scholars have begun to identify the mediating variables that 
connect HR systems and firm performance (e.g., Batt, 2002; Collins & Clark, 2003; 
Sun et al., 2007; Takeuchi, Lepak, Wang, & Takeuchi, 2007).  
Given the emerging nature of the discussion on the SHRM black box, it is 
difficult to systematically examine whether existing theories have been overly 
influenced by one type of institutional context. However, current discussions of the 
HR performance mediator show some signs of cultural bias toward American 
individualism.  
The influence of U.S. individualism can be found first in the behavioral 
perspective, which is one of the most popular views in the SHRM literature. Schuler 
and Jackson (1987) argued that HR practices contribute to positive organizational 
performance by motivating individuals to behave in accordance with organizational 
goals. They suggested that organizations can align employees’ role behaviors with 
strategic goals through proper HR practices. Extending this view, Wright and Snell 
(1998) theorized that carefully designed HR systems can promote employees’ skills 
and behaviors in ways that are congruent with current firm strategy and future 
organizational needs. Explaining the linkage between commitment-based HR or 
HPWSs, McDuffie(1995) suggested that, in order for innovative HR practices to affect 
firm performance, employees must be motivated by the belief that their individual 
interests are aligned with those of the firm. 
An underlined assumption of the behavioral perspective is that individuals’ 
commitment to their organization, job, or both is the major driver of employees’ 
discretionary behaviors, which leads to improved firm performance. Although this 
theory may have some cross-cultural generalizability, some studies have suggested 
that, in a collectivistic culture such as China, employees’ motivation is not only rooted 
on individuals’ satisfaction and commitment, but also strongly affected by personal 
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relationships with their supervisor, colleagues, or extended family (e.g., Schuler & 
Rogovsky, 1998). Therefore, theories that underplay the social dimensions may have 
only limited explanatory power in China. 
The social capital argument, one of the emerging popular theories on SHRM, is 
worth noting in that it emphasizes the role of social dimension as a mediator between 
HRM and firm performance. Social capital refers to an asset embedded in social 
relations (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Theorists have argued that social capital significantly 
enhances organizational outcomes because it increases employees’ commitment to 
their organization, facilitates the inflow of external information, and motivates 
individuals to share valuable knowledge with their colleagues (Dess & Shaw, 2001; 
Leana & Van Buren, 1999). Some SHRM theorists have argued that social capital may 
be the key to open the hidden causal link between HR systems and firm performance. 
They claim that “innovative” HR practices such as high-involvement HR systems 
significantly enhance organizational outcomes through developing social capital. For 
example, Leana and Van Buren (1999) suggested that high-performance work 
practices are beneficial for a company because they produce a stable employment 
environment in which organizational social capital can be readily developed. Evans 
and Davis (2005) proposed that HPWSs contribute to organizational performance 
through tightening social ties between employees, creating shared mental models, and 
promoting the norm of reciprocity. Collins and Smith (2006) showed that 
commitment-based HR practices play a part in the performance of high-technology 
companies through enhancing trust, cooperation, and a shared code of conduct among 
employees.  
Although the social capital approach may have some relevance across different 
cultures, the current theorizing of social capital may misrepresent the reality in some 
countries, those with collectivistic culture. In collectivistic society social relations may 
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not always function as a “capital”. Rather, it may function as a source of a “liability” 
for companies. In China, for example, high performing employees often leave the 
company not by themselves, but as a group (interview, Shanghai, 7 Dec 2006).  
Sometimes, strong informal networks among employees undermine the effectiveness 
of formal leadership structures (interview, Huizhou, 19 July 2006).  Therefore, 
managers of Chinese companies are keen to moderate the negative impact of social 
relations and encourage individualism by introducing individual based human resource 
management practices.  
A few recent studies confirmed that social relations can be a liability rather 
than capital in collectivistic culture of China. For example, Xiao and Tsui (2007) 
found that, in the collectivistic culture of China, individuals with high level of social 
capital may not always contribute to organizations in the ways that Western theorists 
have suggested. Specifically, Xiao and Tsui showed that individuals who occupy the 
position of the “structural hole” do not enjoy information benefits in Chinese firms 
because they are seen as “outsiders” from multiple groups. Chen, Chen, and Xin’s 
(2004) findings about the negativity of relationship-oriented HR practices are also 
informative. Chen et al. demonstrated that HR practices based on guanxi (a Chinese 
concept of interpersonal relations) have a negative impact on the employees’ 
perceptions about fairness of the systems. These studies collectively suggest that 
moderating the negativity of exclusive dense networks is more important in China 
than simply developing more networks among workers. Unfortunately, however, 
current conceptualization of social capital in the mainstream SHRM literature only 
focuses on the positive potentials of social capital and does not pay due attention to the 
dark side of social relations, which undermines the cross-cultural relevance of the 
theories.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
Recognizing the influence of institutional environments on the relation of HR 
systems and firm performance can provide opportunities to resolve enduring 
theoretical problems in a new way. In the following subsection, I will discuss how a 
contextualized understanding of SHRM research may contribute to reframing two 
central theoretical concerns of SHRM: a) the best practice versus best fit debate and  
b) the SHRM black box, a discussion about the causal mechanisms between HRM and 
firm performance. 
 
The Best Practice Versus Best Fit Debate 
 
The existence of a set of universally effective HR practices has been one of the 
critical and continuing subjects of debate in SHRM. Proponents of the universalistic or 
“best practice” approach have argued that there is an inherently effective set of HR 
practices and suggested that the more similar a company’s HR systems are to ideal HR 
systems, the more likely it is that the company will achieve high performance 
(Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994). High performance work systems are the most 
frequently examined candidates of the universally effective HR systems. Pfeffer 
claimed that even cost-based contenders such as Lincoln Electric and Southwest 
Airlines are successfully incorporating high-commitment work practices. He stated 
that, “if one wants to achieve competitive advantage through people, there is little 
evidence that one should not use the [best] practices” (Pfeffer, 1994, p. 65). Although 
there is no absolute consensus on their composing practices, high performance HR 
practices usually include practices of employee involvement in quality enhancement 
activities, team-based production, performance-based compensation, employment 
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security, selective recruiting, and extensive training. Studies have demonstrated that 
high performance HR practices not only are positively associated with firm 
performance in manufacturing companies, but also in service and high-technology 
firms (Batt, 2002; Huselid, 1995; Collins & Smith, 2006). 
The contingency argument, or so-called best fit approach, however, contends 
that the effectiveness of certain HR systems is determined not by their inherent 
characteristics, but by the degree of fit with other contingency factors. To date, 
scholars have addressed the contingency argument in two ways: the strategic fit 
approach and the contextual fit approach. The strategic fit approach, a dominant 
perspective in HR work, claims that the effectiveness of HR practices emanates from 
the alignment between HR systems and business strategies instead of the inherent 
merits of certain HR practices. For example, Delery and Doty (1996) proposed a 
twofold model of HR systems: the market-type system and the internal system. The 
market-oriented system includes HR practices such as hiring outside the organization, 
minimal training, and results-oriented performance appraisals. The internal system 
involves extensive training, job security, and well-defined career ladders. Delery and 
Doty (1996) matched this categorization with the ideal strategy types offered by Miles 
and Snow (1978), which are composed of a prospector, an analyzer, and a defender. 
The argument is that the defender strategy should be matched with the internal 
systems while the prospector strategy should be aligned with a market-based system.  
The contextual fit approach, a recently emerging stream of the contingency 
argument, extends the best fit argument by exploring the impact of external contextual 
factors on the relation of HR systems and firm performance. Batt (2002) found that the 
relation between high performance HR practices and firm performance is stronger in 
markets where those practices are rarely adopted. Datta, Guthrie, and Wright (2005) 
demonstrated that industry characteristics moderate the relationship between HPWSs 
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and firm performance. Sun et al. (2007) reported a statistically significant impact of 
labor market conditions on the relation between high performance HR practices in a 
regional hotel industry of China. 
The contextualized understanding of the relation of HR systems and firm 
performance contributes to the best practice versus best fit debate in at least two ways. 
First, it calls to mind that the debate cannot be completely resolved unless we have 
evidence that the same set of HR practices is equally effective across regions or 
nations of different regulatory, normative, and cultural environments. To date, debates 
have been developed mainly in liberal market economies with individualistic cultures 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. Studies of the 
effectiveness of high performance HR practices in other national and cultural contexts 
are growing in number, but this research is still in the emergent stage (Bae & Lawler, 
2000; Sun et al., 2007). A particularly important context to be examined is transitional 
economies with a collectivistic culture such as China. If certain HR systems that have 
been shown to be effective in developed liberal market economies are demonstrated to 
be generally effective in China across different regions, industries, and ownership 
types, we can be more confident in the existence of universally effective HR systems. 
Second, the realization of an environmental effect on the relation of HR 
systems and firm performance provides opportunities for the best fit argument to move 
one step further. As discussed above, the contingency argument not only has begun to 
examine the fit between HR systems and firm strategy, but also between HR systems 
and contextual factors such as characteristics of target markets (Batt, 2002), industries 
(Datta et al., 2005), and unemployment rates (Sun et al., 2007). As suggested earlier, 
the mainstream SHRM research has not hitherto paid enough attention to the 
contextual factors, especially the national contingency. Consequently, a number of 
important contextual variables have not yet been examined. To name a few, national 
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business systems (Hall & Soskice, 2001), legitimacy of certain employment practices 
in a society (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001), patterns of institutionalization of SHRM 
practices (Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), and cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 
1980) are potentially important contextual factors that may make a difference in the 
relation of HR systems and firm performance across countries as well as within 
nations. 
 
The SHRM Black Box 
 
As mentioned above, the mediating mechanism between HR systems and firm 
performance has emerged as a major concern in SHRM. Scholars have attempted to 
explain why certain HR systems improve firm performance by borrowing insights 
from the resource-based view (Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001), the behavioral 
perspective (Schuler & Jackson, 1987), population ecology (Welbourne & Cyr, 1999), 
the organizational climate (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004), and, more recently, the social 
capital theory (Collins & Clark, 2003; Dess & Shaw, 2001; Leana & Van Buren, 
1999). Although these studies have offered useful clues to the underlying causal 
mechanisms between HR systems and firm performance, more rigorous theoretical 
and empirical research is needed (Sun et al., 2007; Takeuchi et al., 2007). 
One idea that has not been explored in the literature, but might be a promising 
avenue for future research, is that the same set of HR practices may drive firm 
performance through different causal mechanisms in different contexts. Perhaps in 
individualistic cultures, HPWSs contribute to organizational performance through 
their social capital-enhancing aspects (Collins & Clark, 2003; Evans & Davis, 2005) 
while, in collectivistic cultures, HPWSs drive organizational performance through 
moderating the liability of dense social relations. If SHRM researchers will 
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acknowledge that employees’ behaviors, attitudes, and social relations are not free 
from the regulatory, normative, and cultural environments, the black box between HR 
systems and firm performance may be more widely opened in the near future. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To date, research on the relation of HR systems and firm performance has 
underplayed the impact of the institutional environment. This tendency constrains the 
scope of the research frame and undermines the cross-national applicability of the 
findings. In order for SHRM research to generate globally relevant knowledge, it must 
move beyond the current research frames influenced by the contextual assumptions of 
its birthplace.    
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONAL DUALITY AND SUBSIDIARY MANAGEMENT:  
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES’ APPROACHES TO THE LOCAL LABOR 
RELATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Institutional duality is a central concern for the subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations, especially when the host and home countries have quite different 
institutional profiles (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Rosenzweig & 
Singh, 1991; Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). The term institutional duality refers 
to two isomorphic pressures on subsidiaries: one from within multinational networks 
(for internal legitimacy) and the other from local stakeholders (for external 
legitimacy). Because the survival and growth of subsidiaries depends on the level of 
legitimacy endowed by the parent company and the local stakeholders (Hillman & 
Wan, 2005), managers of subsidiaries must be attentive to gaining and maintaining 
legitimacy from both sides (Geppert & Williams, 2006).  
Satisfying these two institutional requirements simultaneously is challenging 
because the two forces are often inconsistent with, and even contradictory toward, 
each other. For example, managers of the subsidiary of a U.S. firm operating in 
Germany may have to reconcile the antiunion ethos of the U.S. headquarters with the 
social norm of collective representation in the host country (Tempel, Edwards, Ferner, 
Muller-Camen, & Wächter, 2006). What, then, should be the behavioral patterns of 
subsidiaries of multinational firms toward inconsistent dual pressures? 
To date, this question has been answered by two major approaches. Earlier 
works on institutional duality answered the question by focusing on the characteristics 
of isomorphic forces. Their primary interest was in the structural elements that 
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determine the similarity of practices either between subsidiaries and the parent firm or 
between subsidiaries and other organizations in the host countries (Rosenzweig & 
Nohria, 1994; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). In contrast, a recently emerging body of 
research has placed more emphasis on the dynamics within subsidiaries. Employing 
Oliver’s (1991) strategic response perspective, this stream of research has described 
subsidiaries as independent entities that strategically respond, rather than passively 
conform, to the given institutional pressures; particularly, from the parent company. In 
this perspective, subsidiaries are assumed to mobilize resources to strategically reject 
the internalization of organizational practices transferred from the parent firm (Ferner, 
Almond, & Collings, 2005; Kostova & Roth, 2002).  
This study is broadly in line with the emerging stream of research. However, 
unlike previous research that has focused on the cross-national transfer of home 
country practices, this study examines the responses of subsidiaries to unique local 
practices. It first investigates how subsidiaries’ responses are influenced by dual 
institutional pressures and organizational characteristics. It then explores how different 
interpretations of a situation are related to organizational behaviors by analyzing 
qualitative data on how the Gonghui, the official trade union, practices within the 
subsidiaries of multinational companies operating in the People’s Republic of China. 
Through examining how subsidiaries make sense of, and formulate responses to, a 
novel local labor practice, the study attempts to deepen the understanding of global 
management. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, I will review the relevant literature on 
the responses of subsidiaries to dual institutional pressures. Next, I will discuss the 
empirical contexts, sample selection, and data collection processes. Then, I will detail 
the major findings of the qualitative study; first, by presenting a model and discussing 
its major elements—three behavioral patterns, three images of unions, and the effects 
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of institutional duality; and, second, by further examining the relationship among 
major variables through a matched comparison of two multinational companies. In the 
final section of the paper, I will discuss future avenues of research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In his seminal work, Perlmutter (1969) proposed that multinational firms 
should grow out of ethnocentric or polycentric companies and must evolve into 
geocentric global companies in which subsidiaries are “neither satellites nor 
independent city states, but parts of a whole whose focus is on worldwide objectives 
as well as local objectives” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 13). This idea has been paraphrased 
and elaborated on in a number of later works. For example, Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1989) suggested that successful multinational companies, which they referred to as 
firms with “transnational solutions,” are to be able to utilize knowledge across national 
borders. In other words, subsidiaries are required to readily internalize global 
knowledge transmitted from the headquarters in addition to constantly promoting local 
knowledge generated in response to regional needs.  
This recommendation, however, is easier said than done. Maintaining 
geographically dispersed subsidiaries that are closely integrated, but sufficiently 
independent, is an inherently demanding task (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). It is 
especially challenging when subsidiaries are located in countries where the regulatory, 
normative, and cognitive institutional environments are different from that of the 
country of origin. Drawing from neoinstitutionalism, scholars have examined this 
challenge in the framework of institutional duality (Kostava, 1999; Rosenzweig & 
Singh, 1991). As mentioned above, institutional duality refers to the twofold 
institutional pressures on subsidiaries of multinational firms for internal legitimacy 
  61
(within the multinational corporation) and external legitimacy (within the host 
country). Because the survival and growth of subsidiaries is possible only when they 
are accepted by both the parent company and the local market, subsidiaries strive to 
ensure that their organizational practices are aligned with internal and external 
institutional requirements. However, the problem is that the two types of institutional 
pressures are not always consistent with each other. More often than not, the two types 
of requirements are divergent and even contradictory. In that case, what would be the 
behavioral response of a subsidiary to these inconsistent dual pressures? 
To date, two groups of research have independently contributed to our 
understanding of the behavior of subsidiaries toward institutional duality. By focusing 
on the isomorphism, an earlier research stream helps us understand the process 
through which subsidiaries become similar to the parent firm or to local organizations. 
By emphasizing the role of agent, a recent perspective highlights the variety of 
subsidiaries’ responses to given dual institutional pressures. In the following, I will 
review these two lines of research in more detail. 
Early studies on this subject were primarily interested in the structural 
elements that determine the strength of the isomorphic pressures. For example, 
Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) proposed that a number of factors may influence the 
degree of isomorphic pressures. Behaviors of subsidiaries may be similar to those of 
the parent firm or local counterparts due to the regulatory systems, the industries, the 
nature of the technology used, and the cultural distance between countries. This theory 
was empirically validated in Rosenzweig and Singh’s (1994) work in which they 
examined the contextual factors that influence the similarity of human resource 
management practices among the parent company, subsidiaries, and local firms. In 
their analysis of U.S. affiliates of foreign-based multinational corporations, 
Rosenzweig and Singh found that the method of founding, the dependence on local 
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inputs, the presence of expatriates, and the communication with the parent company 
affected the strength of institutional pressures on the subsidiary so that its human 
resource management practices became similar to those of the parent firm or local 
counterparts. Later, Kostova (1999) conceptualized the transnational transfer of 
strategic organizational practice as the institutionalization of the practice at the 
recipient subsidiaries. According to Kostova’s theory, the successful transfer of 
practice, or the “institutionalization” of practice, within multinational corporations 
depends on various contextual factors including institutional distance between the 
home and host countries, the relationship between the parent and subsidiaries, and the 
organizational culture of subsidiaries. Building on this work, Kostova and Roth (2002) 
empirically demonstrated that the degree of the diffusion (i.e., institutionalization) of 
quality management practices within multinational networks is moderated by the 
favorability of host country nations’ institutional support for the practices and the 
nature of relations between the parent company and subsidiaries. 
Although the earlier studies have successfully demonstrated the impact of 
isomorphic pressures on the similarities between subunits, more recently, researchers 
point out that previous studies have not paid enough attention to the role of 
subsidiaries in the formulation of local responses to institutional duality (Ferner, et al., 
2005; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Tempel et al. , 2006). Referring to 
Oliver’s (1991) strategic response perspective, these researchers argued that the 
diversity of subsidiaries’ responses toward dual institutional pressures is larger than 
that described in previous studies. In her seminal work, Oliver argued that 
organizations do not simply conform to the institutional pressures, but proactively 
resist against environmental pressures. Drawing from the resource dependence theory, 
she proposed a typology of strategic responses to environmental cues: acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. Oliver suggested that 
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organizational choice among these strategic options depends on (a) the nature of 
institutional pressures and (b) the dependence of organizations on the sources of 
pressures.  
Kostova’s (1999) work was among the first to explicitly discuss the possibility 
of subsidiaries’ resistance to given institutional pressures. She argued that subsidiaries 
may conform to the institutional pressures from the parent company on only the 
surface level. The dependency of subsidiaries on the parent company may enforce the 
adoption of a certain practice, but this does not guarantee the full acceptance of the 
practice by the local employees. In a later study (Kostova & Roth, 2002), Kostova 
refined this idea and empirically demonstrated that subsidiaries tend to ceremonially 
adopt a practice initiated from headquarters when local institutional environments are 
not sufficiently favorable to the practice. Ferner et al.’s (2005) study on subsidiaries’ 
attitudes toward a workforce diversity practice elaborated on this previous line of 
thought. Anchoring in the work of Oliver (1991), Ferner et al. showed that UK 
subsidiaries of a U.S. multinational corporation did not simply conform to the 
workforce diversity program. Despite the U.S. headquarter’s belief that the workforce 
diversity program had been effectively transferred to the UK subsidiaries, the 
subsidiaries managed to avoid full implementation of the program. Ferner et al. argued 
that the differences in the national business systems between the two countries 
provided opportunities for the U.K. subsidiaries to justify and materialize their 
resistance to the “made-in-the-U.S.” human resource management practice. Tempel et 
al. (2006) also relied on Oliver’s (1991) framework and further developed this line of 
thought. These authors argued that subsidiaries of multinational companies are likely 
to display diverse forms of resistance toward the parent firm’s pressure as well as 
against isomorphic pressures from the local environment. In their case studies of U.S.-
owned subsidiaries’ reactions toward collective representation practices in the United 
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Kingdom and Germany, Tempel et al. observed that subsidiary managers adopted 
diverse strategies to simultaneously satisfy internal and external institutional 
pressures.  
By illuminating the active role of agent, the emerging perspective successfully 
demonstrated that subsidiaries’ responses to given dual institutional pressures are 
more diverse than the earlier studies have presumed. However, this emerging 
perspective has at least three rooms for further development. First, the studies that 
emphasize the active role of subsidiaries do not much specify whether subsidiaries 
have always the same range of alternatives from which they can strategically choose. 
A complete portrayal of subsidiaries’ reactions to institutional duality can be drawn 
only after we are better able to specify the conditions where subsidiaries are endowed 
with a wide or a narrow range of behavioral options (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996).  
Second, current understanding of the underlined mechanisms through which 
subsidiaries formulate their own solutions to institutional duality is still scant. The 
current research successfully display that subsidiaries are responding differently to the 
similar environmental cues. However, they rarely specify how it happens. In this 
respect, recent theoretical developments concerning the role of agents’ cognition in the 
process of institutionalization may provide a good starting point. For example, Zilber’s 
(2002) ethnography study on an Israeli rape crisis center showed that the same set of 
practices was interpreted differently among a competing group of agents in the midst 
of institutional change. Drawing from theories of individual decision making, George, 
Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, and Barden (2006) suggested that the diversity of strategic 
responses can be driven by the range of interpretations of the institutional 
environment. They argued that the same institutional environment can be viewed as 
either a threat or an opportunity, and, therefore, the responses to it can vary 
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accordingly. The relevance of these theories in subsidiary management needs be 
examined.  
Third, prior studies tend to focus on the subsidiaries’ resistance patterns 
towards the parent company and examined the institutionalization of practices that 
were originated from the home country. The responses of subsidiaries to local 
practices that are unfamiliar to them are rarely examined. Subsidiaries’ responses 
towards the unfamiliar local practices may require different theoretical explanations 
than subsidiaries’ reaction toward home country practices.  
Drawing from this review of the literature, I will attempt to answer several key 
questions with respect to subsidiaries’ approaches in dealing with unique local labor 
practices. To what extent do dual isomorphic pressures determine subsidiaries’ 
responses to distinctive local practices? How far do the structural elements of 
institutional duality dominate or constrain the strategic options of subsidiaries? To 
what extent, and in what manner, does the interpretation process affect subsidiaries’ 
responses to institutional duality? 
 
METHOD 
 
This study attempts to identify underlying patterns of subsidiaries’ responses to 
novel local labor practices, which has been rarely documented in the literature. 
Therefore, I chose to employ the inductive qualitative method of research. The 
inductive method is an appropriate research strategy when the question is exploratory 
in nature, the state of prior research is immature, the goal of data analysis is to identify 
underlying patterns, and the primary purpose of a study is to propose a suggestive 
theory that invites further works (Edmondson & McManus, 2007).  
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As an empirical context, I chose labor relations of multinational companies in 
China. Besides the practical importance of China as a country that has recently 
attracted a large number of foreign companies (Huang, 2003), the multinational 
corporation in China provides an ideal example from which to examine institutional 
duality because it generally is under intense institutional pressures from both the 
parent company and the local environment. First, the institutional pressure to comply 
with the parent company’s directives is high for subsidiaries in China because they 
tend to rely heavily on headquarters for critical resources like technology, 
management skills, and finance. Second, subsidiaries of multinational corporations in 
China have to overcome their lack of local embeddedness. Although the Chinese 
government offers a number of incentives for incoming foreign capital, it does not 
fully eliminate the “liability of foreignness” in China. More than often not, foreign 
companies are targeted by the local media and condemned as bad corporate citizens. 
Therefore, subsidiaries of multinational firms in China must be attentive to the local 
environment in order to assure a sufficient level of local legitimacy. 
Given that it is implausible to examine all dimensions of subsidiary 
management in China, this study focuses on one important issue: recognition of 
Chinese trade unions. Foreign companies’ attitudes toward Chinese unions is a critical 
topic for study primarily because of the social pressure for unionization in the country. 
Since 2004, the Chinese government has claimed that it will develop a “harmonious 
society.” When it comes to the industrial relations issue, the political propaganda of 
the harmonious society has been translated into an issue of unions. The widely 
publicized event of Wal-Mart unionization in 2006 graphically demonstrated how 
much the Chinese government is committed to the issue of unions, and how much 
managers of foreign companies feel reluctant to recognize unions. 
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In the process of developing and validating the proposed model, I utilized a 
multiple-case study involving 27 firms. In addition, I used the matched pair 
comparison method (Eisenhardt, 1989) in order to further investigate how institutional 
duality influences multinational companies in different organizational and institutional 
settings. 
   
Sample Selection 
 
I selected cases for this study through use of the theoretical sampling procedure 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Based on my initial exploratory fieldwork conducted in summer 
2006, I identified several potentially critical categories that could influence patterns of 
employment relations in the subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies: location 
of the subsidiaries, employment relations of the parent company, country of origin, 
size, and industry. Accordingly, I chose at least two subsidiaries of multinational firms 
in each of the following categories: (a) three regional development stages (first-, 
second-, and third-tier cities); (b) three geographical regions (southern, northern, and 
central coast cities); (c) differing patterns of employment relations in the parent 
company (pro-union vs. union-free policies); (d) origins (U.S., European, and Asian); 
(e) size (subsidiaries of Fortune 500 companies or companies not on the Fortune 500); 
(f) industry (manufacturing vs. service). To obtain a balanced and in-depth 
understanding of the context, I visited the offices of the central government, the 
national headquarters of the Chinese trade union federation, local governments, local 
trade unions, and foreign employers’ associations. I visited a total of 42 subsidiaries of 
27 companies. A summary of the sample profiles is provided in the Appendix. 
In addition, to better understand how the internal and external institutional 
pressures jointly influence labor relations in subsidiaries, I intentionally chose two 
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large multinational companies among the sample for more in-depth case studies. The 
two companies originated in the same country, but had contrasting employment 
relations. (For purposes of this study, I will refer to these companies as Ufree and 
ProU.) I visited multiple subsidiaries of both companies that were located in different 
regions (see the Table 3.1). More details about the two companies will be discussed 
later.      
 
Table 3.1 
Description of the Matched Cases 
 
Companies 
Site Visited 
ProU Ufree 
Global HQ in the parent country 
ProU global HQ (Two HR 
Directors, Two Employees) 
Ufree global HQ (Four HR 
staffs) 
China HQ in the first tier city 
(Beijing) 
ProU China HQ (CEO, HR 
VP, HR Director)  
Ufree China HQ (3) 
ProU2a(CEO, HR Director, 
Manager) 
ProU2b (HR Director) 
Manufacturing 
subsidiaries in 
second tier 
cities  
Eastern 
Central area 
ProU2c (CEO, HR VP, Line 
Manager) 
Ufree2 (1) 
Northern area ProU3a (HR VP) Ufree3a(1) 
Manufacturing 
subsidiaries in 
third tier cities  
Southern 
coastal area 
ProU3b (HR VP, Union 
president, Two Local Staffs) 
Ufree3b(1) 
Total Interviews 19 10 
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Data Sources 
  
Semistructured interviews. During the period between June 2006 and July 
2007, I conducted 108 interviews. Sixty-seven interviews were with individuals 
working for 27 subsidiaries of foreign multinational firms; the other interviews were 
with officials of governmental agencies (9 interviews in 6 offices); local unions (9 
interviews in 4 offices); foreign employers’ associations (6 interviews in 6 offices); an 
international labor activists; and Chinese scholars who have seats in national policy 
advisory committees (16 interviews). Almost all interviews took place at the work 
sites. Most of the interviews lasted between 1 and 3 hours.  
The majority of the interviewees in foreign firms were senior expatriate 
managers who were responsible for the overall human resource management function 
of the subsidiary. In smaller firms, the interviewees were CEOs because they were 
most well informed about the subject. Since the focus of this study is the attitudes and 
behaviors of foreign firms toward Chinese trade unions, interviews with local 
employees were not necessary. However, when the company gave its permission, I 
interviewed trade union leaders and local employees so as to triangulate the 
information obtained from the expatriate managers.  
During the semistructured interviews, I typically first asked foreign managers 
to provide information on subjects such as the general business model, recent 
performance of the subsidiary, the perception of the business environment in general, 
descriptions of the general human resource management policies, and the relationship 
between subsidiaries and the parent company. I then asked a question about the 
relationship between the expatriates and the locals as an introduction to employment 
relations issues. Then, I asked questions about the unions. If the company had a trade 
union, I asked further questions about the history and activities of the union. If the 
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company did not have the trade union, I asked for the manager’s perspectives on trade 
unions. Many of the interviewees did not want to be tape-recorded and requested strict 
confidentiality due to the sensitivity of the trade union issue in China. I conducted the 
interviews in English, Korean, or Chinese. Interviews in Chinese took place in the 
presence of a translator. I took detailed notes both during and after each interview. 
        
Observation of meetings. Participant observation at the meetings of 
employers’ associations helped me to understand how foreign multinational 
corporations collectively made sense of the environment surrounding employment 
relations in China. First, I participated in a 1-day meeting held in Shanghai on 
December 7th 2007. Human resource management professionals representing 12 large 
U.S. and European multinational corporations attended that meeting. The main 
purpose of the meeting was to identify major human resource management challenges 
for multinational corporations operating in China. In addition, I observed two seminars 
(3 hours each) and a national conference (2 days) offered by the Korean Chamber of 
Commerce in China. These membership-based meetings were held between April and 
June 2007 in different industrialized cities in China. The CEOs and senior-level 
managers of Korean companies in China were invited to these meetings for the 
purpose of sharing their perspectives and best practices on employment relations in 
China. More than 30 delegates participated in each meeting. Finally, on July 10th 
2007, I attended a luncheon meeting at Beijing in which senior human resource 
managers who represented the Chinese subsidiaries of nine large Korean multinational 
corporations. During the meeting, human resource managers shared their best 
practices on Chinese trade union and labor relations. Prior personal contacts with the 
leadership of relevant organizations enabled me to sit in on the meetings as a 
researcher. For the most part, I did not voice my opinion during the meetings. Instead, 
  71
I asked questions of participants after the sessions. I took detailed field notes during 
and after the meetings for use in future analyses. 
The observation of the meetings was particularly useful in identifying the 
alternative logics that foreign companies were adopting toward the nature of the 
Chinese trade union. In the meetings, participants often debated about the nature of the 
Chinese trade union, and offered contrasting suggestions on future courses of action 
toward the unions. 
  
Archival data. I also extensively searched for relevant documents on the 
Chinese trade unions and their relationship with foreign multinational companies in 
China. For example, I studied the teaching materials for trade union leaders in China 
to understand how the Chinese government defines the role of the trade union in 
foreign-owned firms. I also collected a large amount of official and informal 
publications from foreign employers’ associations such as the American Chamber of 
Commerce (AmCham), the European Union (EU) Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Korean Chamber of Commerce. These documents helped me to understand how 
foreign multinational firms generally perceived the nature of the Chinese trade union. 
  
FINDINGS 
 
The Variance in Subsidiaries’ Responses to Local Unions 
 
Three alternative approaches were observed to have been adopted by 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations toward Chinese trade unions: 
circumvention, ceremonial recognition, and co-optation. In this subsection, I will 
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describe primary features of the three types of responses. Then, in the subsection that 
follows it, I will discuss determinants of the subsidiaries’ choices. 
  
Circumvention. In China, companies do not have the legal obligation to 
recognize unions unless employees request it. However, the Chinese government 
recently has proclaimed openly that it supports the legal rights of employees including 
the right to organize a union. All of the managers of foreign companies who I 
interviewed were aware of the recent unionization campaign and expressed at least 
some level of concern toward the social pressure to recognize unions. The forced 
unionization of Wal-Mart stores in 2006 was viewed as a clear signal of the Chinese 
government’s commitment to unionizing foreign-owned firms. For some companies, 
the pressure had been actualized because managers had received several phone calls 
from local authorities asking them to recognize unions. However, the majority of the 
subsidiaries (63%) did not recognize unions at the time that I visited them.  
Subsidiaries that had adopted the circumvention approach were using various 
tactics to maintain a union-free workplace. One common strategy was to create an 
alternative organization that could substitute for a union. In Communist China, 
organizing social events and distributing gifts has been considered the major function 
of unions. Referring to company-sponsored employee organizations that could 
function as a pseudounion such as social clubs or an employee board, managers of 
foreign companies claimed that a union would be redundant and would not bring any 
additional benefits to employees. A European human resource director in Beijing said 
that: 
 
“We do not have a trade union. Instead, we have “XXX[company name] 
clubs.” They organize sports competitions, movie nights, and various celebration 
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events. The company fully supports them financially. The clubs basically provide the 
same activities that unions are expected do in China. The money we use for the 
corporate social clubs is actually more than what we are supposed to give to the union 
once we have it” (Interview, 12/21/06). 
 
Another common tactic accompanied by circumvention was generating 
evidence to show that the company respects employees and, more broadly, the 
Chinese people. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities are considered to be 
important methods of increasing the social acceptance of a company so that the 
company can overset criticism about not welcoming local practices such as unions.  
Some companies have attempted to reduce the unionization pressure itself. 
Employers’ organizations have played a significant role in this effort. Many foreign 
companies participate in employers’ associations that represent their home country or 
region such as the United States or Europe, and thereby attempt to influence the local 
and central governments through collective action. For example, AmCham has 
regularly publicized strong concerns about the unionization campaign. In its annual 
White Paper that is distributed in both English and Chinese, the association 
recommended that the Chinese government 
 
“[e]nsure that foreign-invested enterprises in China will not be disadvantaged 
in their dealings with authorities in cases where employees in those enterprises have 
freely chosen not to set up a trade union” (AmCham White Paper, 2007, p. 36) . 
 
In addition to participating in collective action, companies that use the 
circumvention approach attempt to appease unionization pressure through establishing 
and maintaining guanxi (strong personal relationships) with local authorities. Human 
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resource managers of foreign companies regularly invite the local labor authorities to 
dinner. Through ongoing personal interactions, human resource managers develop a 
trust with local authorities and encourage them to stand for their company’s position 
when it comes to labor relations issues.  
Finally, many subsidiaries have used a cost-effective method against 
unionization pressures: pretending to be in the midst of unionization and asking for 
patience until it is accomplished. A human resource director confessed to me that the 
company kept finding made-up justifications for the “unavoidable delay” of the 
unionization process. For example, she once responded to the local authority who 
asked the company to recognize the union by saying, “Unfortunately, the manager 
who has the right to decide it [union recognition] is currently on long-term leave” 
(Shanghai, December 7, 2006). 
In sum, a majority of subsidiaries have resisted local institutional pressure for 
union recognition. To maintain their position, these companies employed diverse 
tactics such as supporting alternative organizations, initiating CSR activities, 
participating in collective actions, developing personal networks, and pretending to be 
in the unionization process. 
 
Ceremonial recognition. The second most frequent response of multinational 
corporations’ subsidiaries to institutional pressures for a union is to recognize the 
union, but only on a paper. A common feature of this mode of response is the lack of 
employee activities under the name of the official trade union, the Gonghui. Let alone 
the absence of collective bargaining and employee representative works, some unions 
do not organize social events regularly at all. In many cases, employees do not even 
know that the company has a trade union. The unions are recognized, but only in the 
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documents submitted to local authorities. A Korean CEO of a small manufacturing 
company stated that:  
 
“We made a union about a year ago. Officials of regional economic 
development bureau had kept pushing us to do it. I was quite reluctant, you know. But 
I came to realize that unions here do not threaten management... I just reported that we 
made a union. In a given form, I wrote down who is the president and who is the vice 
president of the union, and then submit it. That was it. I just did it, and then forgot all 
about it. I have not paid any union fee. No one has ever bothered me with respect to 
unions since then. (Interview, 05/22/07, Tianjin)” 
 
Ceremonial recognition is not necessarily a deceptive behavior toward local 
authorities. Managers of subsidiaries that respond in this way have claimed that the 
“paper union” is maintained with a mutual understanding between local labor bureaus 
and the company. More than often, local authorities have been the first to ask a foreign 
company to recognize a union on paper so that they can count the company as a 
unionized one. An executive of a Korean manufacturing company who also hold a 
leadership position in a local employer organization said: 
 
“It (ceremonial recognition) was not my idea. They gave me a call and 
explained that it is nothing more than a paperwork. Regional government officials 
visited the company, and I filled the paperwork (Interview, 05/24/07, Shanghai)”   
 
When companies came to recognize unions in response to pressures from local 
authorities, the main area of negotiation is the trade union fee, rather than the level of 
union activities. In China, unionized firms are obliged to submit 2% of total wages to 
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regional union offices, sometimes through the local tax bureau. The definition of “total 
wages,” however, is largely negotiable. For example, an appliance component 
manufacturing factory in Shandong Province has recognized a union since late 2006. 
The company appointed a trusted individual, its accountant, as the union president, but 
the union nevertheless exists only on paper. When the company reported unionization, 
the local tax bureau agreed to consider only 60% of the company’s employees as 
eligible for the union so that the company could submit a discounted amount of union 
fees. The CEO of the company suggested to me that negotiating the amount of the 
union fee is a normal practice in the region.  
 
Co-optation. A few subsidiaries of multinational companies co-opt a union as a 
managerial partner. In this company, unions are substantial, but they are not 
necessarily independent from the company. In the co-optation mode, union leaders can 
be freely elected by employees among multiple candidates. However, the company 
preserves the right to recommend candidates. The chosen union leaders are invited to 
board meetings and informed about major human resource management decisions. 
However, they are not allowed to openly oppose to the company’s decisions. Unions 
are given a significant degree of discretion and financial support for arranging social 
events. They also play a critical role in maintaining the quality of company-provided 
dining services and dormitory facilities. However, they are not allowed to organize 
strikes. Union leaders are well respected by the company through generous 
compensation packages and perquisites. Instead, they are expected to work for 
maintaining “harmonious workplace”. 
By recognizing and supporting the union, these subsidiaries expect to increase 
employees’ acceptance of the company’s human resource management decisions and 
promote the image of a socially responsible company. Since major human resource 
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decisions are pre-approved by the union leaders, companies can easily defend the 
legitimacy of decisions, especially adverse actions such as firing.  
A substantial presence of a trade union is also believed to increase labor 
stability and discourage wild strikes. At least on an official level, all unions in China 
are branches of a monopolistic national organization, the Gonghui, that claims itself to 
be a representative body of “all laborers in the workplace.” Therefore, any collective 
action without the Gonghui’s approval can be considered as legally ungrounded. In 
other words, unionized firms can claim that any collective antagonistic behavior of 
employees without the Gonghui’s support is illegal. Therefore, recognizing and 
supporting cooperative unions may facilitate the control of labor.  
In addition to preempting wild strikes, subsidiaries with the co-optation 
approach can promote the local reputation of the company as a responsible corporate 
citizen. Ever since the Chinese government initiated its union recognition campaign, 
some foreign companies such as Wal-Mart and Kodak have been condemned as 
foreigners who do not respect the “legitimate rights of workers” in China. In contrast, 
foreign companies that show proactive recognition are praised by the local and 
national media. For example, a large Korean tire manufacturing factory in Nanjing has 
been recognized as a workplace with “a model trade union” after adopting the co-
optation approach to unions. A senior manager of the subsidiary proudly said, “We 
have many visitors from Beijing. They want to see what an exemplary trade union 
looks like.”   
Maintaining unions active as well as cooperative cannot be achieved without 
substantial investments. First of all, the company with cooptation approach needs to 
abide by the regulations with respect to union fee. Given the fact that many local 
competitors do not pay the full amount of union fee (2% of total wage), the full 
payment of union fee may undermine the competitive advantage of the company in 
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price sensitive market. Second, companies need to financially support union acitivies 
in order to maintain the union dependent on the company. Third, companies with 
cooptation strategy need to invest additional money to maintain the "cooperative 
spirit" of union leadership. For example, the Korean tire manufacturing company in 
Nanjing provides union leaders a decent compensation package accompanies by 
various perquisites including spacious offices and luxury cars for private use. 
 
Three Cognitive Frames for Chinese Unions 
 
Then, what Shapes the Subsidiaries’ Responses? What are the underlying 
mechanisms that lead subsidiaries to take the action of circumvention, ceremonial 
recognition, or co-optation toward a union? According to my observations, 
subsidiaries erect an image of the union and use that impression to justify their 
behavior toward it. The image of a union set up by a subsidiary falls roughly into three 
categories: a phantom threat, a social lubricant, and an inert substance. I will first 
explain these three images and then discuss major factors that shape the view of a 
union by subsidiary managers. Figure 3-1 shows the schematic relationship among 
three alternative behavioral patterns, three images of unions, and four institutional 
factors. 
Phantom threat. Due to the close relationship between the Communist Party 
and the government, unions in China are often described as governmental organs. To 
many foreign managers, the connection between unions and the government is viewed 
as a source of risk. Because foreign firms do not fully trust the Chinese government, 
they do not trust trade unions. Expressing his concern about the risk of recognizing 
trade unions, an employment relations specialist in Shanghai based a U.S. service firm 
said that: 
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“They [Chinese government] want to extend the control mechanism into 
enterprises. As you know, unions are the governmental organ here. Once it [unions] 
comes, it will lie underneath the ground. Any information can be directly and rapidly 
reported through the hierarchy. Using the information acquired by this channel, the 
Chinese government may blame foreign companies if they want to. XYZ [the 
company name] will be okay because we highly respect the Chinese government and 
strictly follow laws and regulations. But, who knows?” (Interview, 05/23/07). 
Determinants of Foreign-owned Companies’ Union Approaches 
Figure 3.1 
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The nationalism of the Chinese people is another source of concern to 
subsidiaries of multinational companies. Subsidiary managers often feel that Chinese 
workers treat them as “foreigner exploiters” who can be organized against. This 
concern of foreign managers has been reinforced by publicized events such as the 
labor strikes that occurred in the Dalian Economic Development Zone. In July 2005, a 
wild strike against a sudden workload increase in Toshiba’s manufacturing facility in 
the northern coastal city of Dalian was followed by a series of strikes in other Japanese 
companies in the same region. The strikes affected more than 15 Japanese companies 
and lasted until September of the same year. Although the main drivers of the strikes 
were working conditions and pay raises, many foreign managers believed that anti-
Japanese sentiment and the patriotism of Chinese workers contributed partly to the 
diffusion of the strikes among the Japanese firms. Referring to the strikes, a human 
resource executive of a large Asian chemical company in Beijing said that: 
 
“I think trade unions in China are heavily influenced by the nationalism. As 
was shown in the [nationalism-based labor disputes] case of the Japanese companies in 
Dalian, labor relations in foreign-owned firms is susceptible to ethnocentric patriotism. 
It is not just about offering a higher wage and better working conditions” (Interview, 
07/10/07). 
 
Whether these concerns accurately reflect the real nature of Chinese trade 
unions is debatable. Rejecting the claim that trade unions are governmental organs that 
may stand against foreign firms, an official of the All China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU) argued the belief about the close relationship between the 
government and unions is “simply not true.” She asserted that the government has 
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better ways to influence foreign firms than through unions (personal communication, 
December 22, 2006). Recent studies have also suggested that the link between unions 
and the government is not as strong as it seems (Liu, 2008).  
However, even the officials of unions do not clearly claim that they are 
independent from the government. An instructor of government funded institution for 
union leaders acknowledge the influence of the Chinese communist party and its 
government on unions as follows: 
 
“When I visited in western countries, I noticed that the relationship between 
regional/national unions and enterprise labor union is much more like support, but not 
leading. But to what extent, it will change, I am not sure. Because, the function of 
labor union is decided by the political policy, and the political policy is determined by 
the economy. Also, the role of labor union leader will be the main focus of future 
reformation”(Interview, 12/06/06). 
  
The above statement of union officials suggest that foreign managers’ 
perception about the close relationships between unions and the government is not 
ungrounded. However, the close relationships between unions and the government do 
not lead every manager of foreign companies to believe that unions will be a source of 
risks rather than benefits. Rather, as discussed below, some foreign managers perceive 
unions are beneficial because of the close relationship to the government.   
Social lubricant. Local labor authorities have commonly argued that unions in 
China lubricate the relations between management and employees. Therefore, these 
authorities have suggested that recognizing unions is actually beneficial to 
management. A regional union official in Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, 
asserted that: 
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“Without the trade union, the relationship between the employer and 
employees can easily deteriorate. Once there is a trade union, it will stand between the 
two. Trade unions in China do not go against management. Trade unions represent 
both management and employees” (Interview, 06/13/07). 
 
Regional union authorities have also claimed that the intimate relationship 
between the government and unions is actually helpful to companies because the 
Chinese government and its ruling Communist Party are committed to economic 
development based on stable labor. A high-level union official in Shenzen City argued 
that, “because the Communist Party leads the trade union, it does not solely serve 
employees or management. It is in a neutral position” (personal communication, June 
14, 2007). 
The pro-management spirit of unions is clearly expressed in many parts of 
official ACFTU publications. For example, an official textbook for union leader 
education program writes that the supporting economic development is one of the 
main roles of unions. In the section that describes the major goals of unions, the 
textbook stipulates: 
  
“the economic function of unions is to improve managerial effectiveness of a 
company. Unions achieve this central objective by promoting the quality of products, 
services, human resources, firms’ capability to meet the market demand, maximizing 
the potentials of the company, as well as reducing the production costs. Unions should 
align the economic function with companies’ production activities (ACFTU, p. 151)”  
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Some foreign managers have accepted this view and consider unions to 
function as a lubricant that promotes cooperative relations between foreign employers 
and employees. These managers believe that unions in China are advantageous; 
especially, for “foreigners.” According to their perspective, unions can moderate the 
potential negative reactions of Chinese employees toward managerial decisions. A 
CEO of a subsidiary located in Nanjing recounted these benefits of allowing a trade 
union to exist as a partner to the company: 
 
“In many respects, it is more desirable to let the trade union do the human 
resource management. Because we [expatriates] are foreigners, it is not easy for us to 
manage Chinese employees. They do not fully trust foreigners. They [Chinese] are 
more willing to follow someone who is Chinese than a foreigner. . . . We have 
arranged that all adverse actions such as firing and punishment are completely handled 
by the Chinese. We [expatriates] take only the bright side of human resource 
management such as promotion and performance recognition events” (Interview, 
05/25/07). 
 
In addition, a union can act as a lubricant that enhances the relationship 
between the company and local stakeholders. By respecting and supporting the 
“government organ,” companies can develop the image of responsible corporate 
citizen. In order to maximize this potential benefit, some foreign companies have 
implemented corporate social responsibility activities through unions. For example, a 
large Korean company in Tianjin financially supports its union to regularly conduct 
community outreach programs such as nursing home visits and poverty relief 
missions. 
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Inert substances. Finally, some subsidiary managers do not consider unions to 
be either a threat or an opportunity. Unions are considered as neither harmful nor 
beneficial to management, but as remnants of the old planned economy era that no 
longer have a unique function. Although the Chinese government has recently been 
promoting the employee representative role of unions, managers with this view have 
not yet found visible signs of change. They do not buy into the argument that unions 
will be a significant threat due to their connections with the government or employee 
groups. However, these managers also disagree with the idea of local unions 
functioning as a social lubricant. In other words, unions are perceived as an inert 
substance that does not interact with almost every element of managerial activities, 
except some administrative tasks. A human resource manager of an international joint 
venture company in Beijing said: 
 
“We have unions. One of our company executives is the union president. The 
union occasionally organizes a social event, but not often. When somebody has to sign 
on a document as a representative of employees, the union president does it. Unions 
might be helpful for human resource management in some ways, but not very much. In 
China, unions do not hurt management. . . . When I visited Sweden on business, I was 
surprised to learn how much time Swedish human resource managers spend on dealing 
with unions. I feel lucky to work in an environment where I don’t have to pay 
attention to unions” (Interview, 06/13/07). 
 
In summary, managers of foreign-invested companies in China perceive unions 
either as a potential threat that might undermine the managerial control, as resources 
for developing better relationships with employees and external stakeholders, or as a 
legacy of the planned economy that does not have a unique role. These perceptions are 
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reinforced or inflicted by the subsidiary’s contextual and organizational factors. In the 
next section, I will discuss the factors that collectively influence subsidiary managers’ 
attitudes toward Chinese unions.  
 
Institutional and Organizational Determinants 
 
Dual institutional pressures. A substantial amount of evidence suggests that 
the subsidiaries’ attitudes toward local unions are significantly influenced by the 
pressures within the multinational network. Although unions in China are qualitatively 
different from unions in the home countries of multinational corporations because 
Chinese unions rarely represent the collective interests of employees, subsidiaries 
continue to attempt to reenact their views of home country unions in the Chinese 
context. Therefore, on the one hand, multinational companies that have experienced 
positive interactions with unions in their home country tend to perceive the unions in 
China as a social lubricant. On the other hand, companies that have accumulated 
negative experiences with unions in their home country tend to view unions as a 
source of risks. A human resource director working in the Beijing branch of a large 
information technology company explained how the union concept in his home 
country headquarters influenced the union policy in its Chinese subsidiary: 
 
“The main reason that ABC [the company name] does not recognize the 
Gonghui is the strict policy of the home country headquarters.... In China, unions do 
not have the right to organize collective actions. Therefore, in my opinion, they are not 
a trade union. But, the problem is that . . . the Gonghui is officially translated as “trade 
unions.” Once it is translated as “trade unions,” the Gonghui is subject to the union-
free policy of the headquarters” (Interview, 05/01/07). 
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Local institutional pressures also play a significant role in shaping subsidiaries’ 
attitudes. In highly industrialized regions, regional unions often capitalize on their 
relationships with government authorities and pressure foreign firms to recognize 
unions (Liu, 2008). At the same time, regional unions spread the word that they will 
not undermine managerial discretion. In contrast, in underdeveloped regions where 
local governments pay more attention to attracting foreign investment, local officials 
even offer protection from unionization pressure in exchange for capital investment.  
Professional associations and conferences are also important sources of local 
institutional pressures. The observation that I made at a meeting of human resource 
professionals illustrates how the normative institutionalization of the circumvention 
strategy occurs. In December 7th, 2006, human resource executives from 12 large 
multinational companies convened in Shanghai to discuss current issues relating to 
human resource management in China. During the daylong meeting, these human 
resource managers shared their concerns about the potential risks in recognizing 
unions. The consensus developed at this meeting was that the Gonghui is a potential 
threat to foreign companies because it is a government organ. During the break 
between the sessions, participants exchanged recounts of their own experiences and 
ideas about ways to avoid unionization pressures. My participant observations of two 
other employers’ meetings also confirmed that the networks of foreign employers in 
China play a significant role in institutionalizing subsidiaries’ attitudes toward unions.  
 
Domestic and cross-national organizational factors. In addition to external 
contextual factors, organizational characteristics promote positive or negative attitudes 
toward unions. Organizational factors can be identified on the level of the subsidiary 
(domestic) or the multinational corporation (cross-national). On the subsidiary level, 
ownership structures, local visibility, size, and organizational complexity were 
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observed to affect attitudes toward unions. For example, when subsidiaries are jointly 
owned with a state or local government, they need to develop cooperative 
relationships with local partners. In this case, unions can act as glue between foreign 
investors and domestic partners. For example, in an automotive component company 
in Nanjing, the union president was chosen to represent the Chinese investors so that 
the two partners could share the responsibility of adversarial managerial decisions 
such as firing employees.  
On the level of the multinational corporation, the orientation of headquarters 
toward localization encourages subsidiaries to show a positive attitude about unions. 
For example, a large Korean steel company has recognized unions in all three of its 
manufacturing subsidiaries in China, despite the fact that managers have discouraged 
unionization in the parent company for a long time. An underlying driver of this 
relatively positive attitude toward unions in China is the Korean company’s strong 
commitment to the local market. The aim of the company’s manufacturing facilities is 
to serve the rapidly growing Chinese domestic market. “Localization” is an important 
keyword for the subsidiaries (personal communication, 05/21/07). With this spirit, the 
human resource executive of one subsidiary of the Korean company was proud about 
the subsidiary’s localized people management including that of labor unions. 
 
MATCHED COMPARISON 
 
In the above subsections, I have identified three interpretations of the nature of 
unions in China, and discussed two major forces—institutional pressures and 
organizational characteristics—that affect how subsidiary managers justify their 
interpretations. In this subsection, I will further specify how these variables interact 
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with each other in formulating behavioral patterns. I will do so by comparing two 
companies with similar organizational characteristics, but contrasting union policies.  
Sample selection is a critical first step for case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989). I 
chose two companies, which I designated as Ufree and ProU, because they were quite 
similar in their business lines, international experience, and cultural background, but  
considerably different with respect to employment relations in their home country 
headquarters. They were both highly successful Fortune 500 companies originating 
from the same country—South Korea. Both Ufree and ProU manufactured 
technology-intensive electronics products including micro audio devices, mobile 
communication devices, upscale home appliances, and other core components of 
digital systems. Many of the two companies’ products competed directly in the same 
U.S., European, and Asian (including Chinese) markets. They each started their 
manufacturing operations in China during the early 1990s. Both firms ran about the 
same number of manufacturing sites across the coastal cities of China (as of 2007, 
Ufree has 13 and ProU has 14), and some were located in the same cities.  
Although Ufree and ProU were similar in many aspects as discussed above, 
they had developed quite contrasting employment relations policies in their home 
country. Ufree had maintained a strong union-free policy and often had been blamed 
for its antiunionism. The union free policy of this company is traced back to 1970s 
when the unionization of female workers of a manufacturing facility attempted to 
organize a trade union. The founder of the company claimed that unions could only be 
established “over his dead body” and proactively dismantled the unionization 
campaign (Cho, 2005). Since then, the Ufree has exerted a serious amount of efforts to 
discourage the union activism within the company. On the one hand, those who 
attempted to organize union were driven out or encouraged to leave the company with 
a substantial severance package. On the other hand, Ufree has offered the most 
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competitive compensation and benefit package in the relevant labor markets to reduce 
the perceived need of unionization.   
Along with the union-free policy, Ufree has developed human resource 
management systems that reward individuals’ performance. The pay differentials 
between the highest performers and the lowest are larger than other comparable large 
companies in Korea. Low performers are continuously “ushered” to leave the 
company. 
In contrast, ProU had developed a highly effective labor relations program and 
was well known for promoting a cooperative relationship between management and 
labor unions. In this company, labor unions and management consider each other as a 
strategic partner for the business. Unions are invited to important corporate meetings 
and encouraged to participate decision making processes. Downsizing is highly 
avoided, and only occurred in concurrence with unions. In response, unions respect 
managerial decisions on technological innovations and work restructuring.  
ProU’s human resource management systems were designed to encourage a 
culture of cooperation among employees. Union leaders were invited to participate in 
board meetings. Employees were offered a high level of job security. Training 
program is designed under the assumption that employees will spend most of their 
working ages in the company. 
The Chinese subsidiaries of Ufree and ProU were selected in ways that have 
captured the variance of the local institutional pressures. Studies of regional disparity 
in China have suggested that the level of economic development and openness to 
foreign capital have had profound impacts on the business environment including 
employment relations (Kanbur & Zhang, 2005). Foreign multinational companies have 
commonly used a three-tiered categorization of Chinese cities in their decisions about 
investment and expatriate compensation packages. The first-tier cities are the most 
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developed and cosmopolitan cities (e.g., Beijing and Shanghai) where most Chinese 
headquarters of multinational firms are located. The second-tier cities are those that 
have been recently developed. Because manufacturing is the major industry in second-
tier cities, labor disputes are more severe than in first- and third-tier cities. Foreign 
companies in the second-tier cities tend to feel a strong degree of unionization 
pressure. The third-tier region is an underdeveloped or less-developed area. In general, 
the main interest of the officials in third-tier cities is to attract new foreign companies. 
Therefore, the pressure for unionization is very low. For the purpose of this study, I 
compared the subsidiaries of Ufree and ProU in the second- and third-tier cities. 
Conceptually, the second-tier cities represent a region with high unionization pressure 
while the third-tier cities represent a region with low unionization pressure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Results of Matched Comparison 
Figure 3.2 
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Major Findings 
 
On a behavioral level, the results of this study confirmed prior international 
business research on institutional duality (See the Figure 3-2). For example, the parent 
company effect was obviously observed. 
On the one hand, when the parent company had a union-free policy, no 
subsidiaries in China adopted a co-optation approach. On the other hand, when the 
parent firm had a pro-union attitude, all Chinese subsidiaries recognized unions at 
least ceremonially. The effect of local institutional forces was also evident. In cities 
where unionization pressure was strong, all subsidiaries of both companies recognized 
unions at a minimum on paper. In cities where unionization pressure was weak, no 
subsidiary took the co-optation approach. It seems that internal and external 
institutional pressures do not affect subsidiaries’ choices by enforcing one type of 
behavior, but instead by reducing the range of options. When two institutional forces 
contradicted with each other, subsidiaries took the ceremonial recognition route so that 
they could avoid punishment from both sides.  
On a cognitive level, however, the data offers somewhat novel results that may 
not be readily explained by the existing literature. Below, I will discuss two very 
interesting observations that may provide new insights for future theory development. 
 
Similar behavioral pattern was driven by different cognitive frames. 
Ceremonial recognition was the most prevalent behavioral pattern. It was found in 
almost every type of institutional duality. But, the images of unions that supported the 
adoption of ceremonial recognition ran the full gamut from phantom threat to inert 
substance. For example, both Ufree2 and ProU2b ceremonially recognized unions. 
However, human resource managers of both subsidiaries had contrasting views of 
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unions: phantom threat and social lubricant. The human resource manager of Ufree2 
complained that headquarters did not understand this “uniqueness” of Chinese unions 
and, therefore, the company was losing opportunities to capitalize on the benefits of 
having cooperative unions in Chinese subsidiaries.  
In contrast, the human resource manager of ProU2b argued that a union was 
unnecessary and even might be dangerous. He suggested that the reason why the 
subsidiary maintained the paper union was the home country headquarter’s policy that 
enforced unionization of all manufacturing subsidiaries in China. He asserted that: 
 
“We recognized the trade union from the beginning [because it is the 
company’s global policy]. . . . The human resource management executive is the union 
president in my subsidiary. . . . I am concerned about the ever-increasing labor 
problems in China. We are keeping an eye on the future of unions [hoping it does not 
emphasize the employee representative role]” (Interview, 6/15/07) . 
 
The finding that a similar behavioral pattern was associated with different or 
even contrasting understandings of the situation raises an interesting question about 
the relationship between the institutionalization process and equifinality. Equifinality 
is defined by a tendency to achieve the same consequence through different paths 
(Katz & Kahn, 1978). Traditionally, institutional theory has suggested that the shared 
understanding of a situation encourages organizations to adopt the same type of 
practice. Therefore, institutionalized practice is deemed to be the “objectification” of 
underlying cognitive consensus (Zucker & Tolber, 1996). But, the current finding 
indicates that organizations may objectify different sets of practice based on different 
understandings of a situation. Future study on this issue may lead to new insights on 
the institutionalization process. 
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Diverse behavioral patterns found under similar institutional forces. 
Evidence showed that the one combination of internal and external institutional forces 
did not necessarily lead to one type of behavior. As is shown in the figure 2-2, for 
example, ProU’s subsidiaries in the same environment (the context of high 
unionization pressure) responded to unions differently (ceremonial recognition or co-
optation). The responses of Ufree’s subsidiaries under a similar context (low 
unionization pressure) also varied. This finding is consistent with Oliver’s (1991) 
argument that organizations do not show the same reaction to the same institutional 
pressure.  
Then, what factors can explain this variance? In my case studies, the variance 
under the same institutional (internal and external) environments was associated with 
the difference in the perceived value of unions. For example, managers of two 
subsidiaries of ProU that adopted the co-optation approach (ProU2a and ProU2c) 
showed a strong belief in the union’s role of social lubricant while the human resource 
manager of ProU2b discounted the positive role of unions, arguing that he should be 
prepared for a potential antagonistic relationship with unions.  
The difference in the perceived value of a union seems to have to do with the 
organizational characteristics such as the operational complexity. For example, 
ProU2a was composed of six independent subunits that collectively hired over 9,000 
workers in its peak time. Due to its size and complexity, the subsidiary required an 
intermediate organization that effectively represented employee voices so that 
unexpected labor disputes could be prevented. Therefore, a co-optation strategy for 
unions could easily gain legitimacy in that subsidiary. In contrast, ProU2b had a 
simple organizational structure. It hired about 1,000 workers in peak times, and 
produced only one type of product.  
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The behavioral differences between Ufree3a and Ufree3b also can be explained 
by the organizational variables. Ufree3a was a fully foreign-owned firm and the 
largest manufacturing company in the entire province in terms of sales. Due to its 
visibility, the company was susceptible to severe monitoring by local stakeholders. 
Ufree3a had a strong need to demonstrate its commitment to Chinese employees and 
the local community. In contrast, Ufree3b was less visible in local community. 
Ufree3b was a local major employer, but not the largest factory in the region like 
Ufree3a. Therefore, the expected benefit of recognizing a union was generally lower 
for Ufree3b than Ufree3a. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
I began this paper by noting that institutional duality is one of the critical issues 
in international business research. Recent studies on this subject have called for in-
depth understanding about the process through which subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations devise their responses under dual institutional pressures. Based on an 
inductive study on the approaches of multinational companies to Chinese unions, I 
developed a model that explains how their subsidiaries formulate their responses 
toward novel local labor practices. Future studies will need to examine the external 
validity of the findings.  
This study contributes to international business research in several ways. First, 
it is among the earliest to examine multinational companies’ responses to local 
practices that are too new to be covered simply by existing behavioral scripts in the 
parent company. Previous studies primarily have been interested in the transfer of 
practices from the parent company. Second, this paper attempted to reconcile the 
institutional determinism of earlier studies and the “strategic” perspectives of more 
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recent works. This research showed that subsidiaries’ responses are not totally 
determined externally, nor are they solely formulated strategically. Subsidiaries have 
to choose their course of action within the given institutional constraints (Goodrick & 
Salancik, 1996). Third, this study highlighted the importance of the social implications 
of multinational corporations’ industrial relations practices. It showed that the 
legitimacy concern is a major driver of subsidiaries’ responses to unionization in 
China. It confirmed that subsidiary management can be better understood by 
employing neoinstitutionalism perspectives.  
In addition, this study contributes to industrial relations research; particularly, 
Chinese labor relations research. There has been a growing interest in the changing 
nature of Chinese labor unions in the era of “harmonious society” (e.g., Liu, 2008). By 
identifying patterns of employers’ reactions to the Chinese national unionization 
campaign, this study enables future researchers to examine the dynamic features of 
this change.  
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CHAPTER 4 
OVERCOMING THE LIABILITY OF FOREIGNNESS THROUGH PEOPLE: 
THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG FOREIGN MAJORITY OWNERSHIP, 
UNIONS, TRAINING INVESTMENT, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN AN 
EMERGING ECONOMY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overcoming the disadvantages associated with being foreign is one of the 
central concerns for companies operating in multiple nations. Due to their lack of local 
legitimacy and native knowledge, foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies face 
additional costs that domestic companies do not encounter (Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer & 
Mosakowski, 1997). Studies have shown that, other things being equal, foreign firms 
are less profitable and have a lower probability of survival than comparable local 
domestic firms (Mezias, 2002; Miller & Parkhe, 2002; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer & 
Mosakowski, 1997). Zaheer (1995) called this phenomenon the “liability of 
foreignness.”  
The liability of foreignness (LOF) is an issue that is especially important to 
multinational firms operating in emerging economies. Over the past several decades, 
emerging economies like India and the People’s Republic of China have attracted an 
enormous amount of foreign direct investment. Case studies have suggested that some 
of the multinational firms achieved great success in these lands of new opportunity 
(e.g., Luo, 2000). However, doing business in emerging economies remains 
challenging because of factors such as the nationalistic governments, complex 
regulatory systems, and shortages of skilled labor (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 
2000). The rapidly growing competitiveness of domestic private firms is another 
  100
challenge that exacerbates the inherent disadvantages of foreign firms in these regions 
(Xu, Pan, Wu, & Yim, 2006).  
Prior studies have identified several actions that multinational companies take 
to reduce the risks and costs of doing business abroad when they decide to enter 
emerging markets. For example, researchers have suggested that multinational firms 
can reduce the LOF by selecting the right countries (Xu & Shenkar, 2002), choosing 
appropriate entry modes (Chan & Makino, 2007; Li, Yang, & Yue, 2007), and 
considering local competitive pressures (Miller & Eden, 2006). However, relatively 
less is known about the measures that subsidiaries take after they enter emerging 
markets. Particularly little research has been done on the role of people management 
practices on the reduction of the LOF in the contexts of emerging markets.  
In this study, I argue that foreign-owned companies in emerging markets can 
moderate the LOF through effective people management practices. Specifically, 
drawing from institutional theory and the knowledge management literature, I contend 
that foreign-owned companies can moderate the negative effects of being foreign 
through legitimacy-enhancing industrial relations (e.g., recognizing government-
endorsed employee organizations) and knowledge transfer-enhancing practices (e.g., 
investment in training). Empirical analyses of data from a large national survey of the  
Chinese manufacturing sector generally support the hypotheses detailed below.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Foreign Ownership and Firm Performance in Emerging Markets 
  
Two competing arguments put forward contrasting performance implications 
of foreign ownership in emerging economies. One argument, the ownership advantage 
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thesis, focuses on the knowledge and legitimacy benefits of multinationality in the 
competition of the emerging market. According to this view, foreign-owned firms are 
likely to achieve a higher return than their domestic counterparts in the emerging 
economy due to: (a) the superior knowledge transferred from overseas units and (b) 
the social legitimacy endowed by the development-oriented government. The other 
argument, the liability of foreignness perspective, emphasizes the difficulties of doing 
business in transitional economies and predicts that foreign-owned firms will exhibit 
lower performance than domestic companies because of (a) the lack of local 
legitimacy and (b) the imperfect cross-national knowledge transfer. 
The ownership advantage view suggests that subsidiaries of multinational 
companies operating in emerging markets may enjoy the advantages of superior 
knowledge transferred from the home country. Porter (1990) noted that the 
competitive advantage of global firms is influenced significantly by the country of 
origin. Globally competitive firms are often grown out of the supportive business 
environments of their home country. A sophisticated home market enables a 
multinational firm to develop advanced products and services, which enhances the 
competitiveness of the firm in global markets (Porter, 1990). Therefore, companies 
from developed economies have a greater chance of carrying a competitive edge over 
firms that have originated in emerging economies.  
In addition, foreign multinational firms operating in emerging economies, 
unlike in developed economies, may undergo less legitimacy problems and even may 
enjoy higher legitimacy than domestic companies. Jansson (2007) suggested that 
multinational firms may have high degree of legitimacy in emerging economies 
because they are considered to be crucial contributors of economic development, 
technological advancements, and job creation. Therefore, many governments of 
emerging economies have introduced institutional and regulatory supports for 
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incoming foreign firms. According to this view, it is expected that foreign-owned 
firms in emerging economies will achieve a higher rate of return than their domestic 
counterparts. This assumption has been reinforced by popularized success stories of 
early movers into these economies (Luo, 2000).  
However, the LOF argument suggests that the opposite might be true. 
According to Zaheer (1995) and others (e.g., Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997; X & 
Shenkar, 2002), foreign-owned firms will endure the disadvantages of “foreignness” 
due to their lack of local embeddedness and the deficiency of local knowledge. 
Nationalistic buyers may severely punish foreign firms for small incidents that affect 
their local reputation. Lack of information networks may cause foreign firms to incur 
higher costs in managing local supply chains than their domestic counterparts. 
Talented local employees may require high wage premiums, show low organizational 
commitment, and be prepared to leave the company because they perceive obstacles to 
developing a long-term career plan within a foreign firm that is weakly embedded in 
the host country. Unless the host environment has a cosmopolitan culture in which 
foreignness does not contribute to the visibility of the firms or institutional favoritism 
toward domestic firms, foreign firms need to overcome a significant degree of 
foreignness disadvantages (Meta & Portugal, 2002; Mezias, 2002; Miller & Parkhe 
2002; Nachum, 2003; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997).  
The LOF argument suggests that foreign-owned firms are likely to show lower 
performance than comparable domestic private firms; particularly, in emerging 
economies because the cost of doing business abroad can be significant and the benefit 
of multinationality may not be perfectly materialized. First, foreign firms tend to incur 
much higher costs than their domestic counterparts due to various institutional 
barriers. The relationship-based, rather than rule-based, economic transactions in 
emerging economies (Peng, 2003) are the cause of these higher costs to foreign firms. 
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In China, for example, local firms are able to easily use preexisting personal networks 
to minimize daily transaction costs while foreign firms must invest many years to gain 
the access to local networks (Standifird & Marshall, 2000). Immature regulatory 
systems of emerging economies impose additional burdens on multinational 
companies. In emerging economies, protection of intellectual property rights is a 
challenging task because the local judicial systems do not provide impartial and 
effective legal services. Sometimes, this causes severe financial damage to foreign 
firms. Recent disputes between foreign and local Chinese automakers illustrate well 
the risk of doing business in an emerging economy (Goodman, 2004).  
Second, the firm-specific knowledge, the basis of a foreign firm’s competitive 
advantage to overcome the local disadvantages, may be imperfectly transmitted to 
subsidiaries for various reasons. The risk of technology appropriation may limit the 
scope of knowledge transfer from the beginning (Zhang, Li, Hitt, & Gui, 2007). To 
avoid technology leakages, a parent firm may allow transfer of only partial and 
outdated knowledge, instead of holistic and cutting-edge knowledge, to subsidiaries in 
emerging economies (Zhao, 2006). In addition, a lack of education and training may 
hinder local employees’ understanding of the transferred knowledge and systems 
(Minbaeva, Pedersen, Bjorkman, Fey, & Park, 2003).  
In summary, neither the foreign ownership advantage argument nor the 
concept of the LOF provides clear prediction to the relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance. Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Foreign majority ownership is positively related to firm 
performance in the emerging economy. 
Hypothesis 1b. Foreign majority ownership is negatively related to firm 
performance in the emerging economy. 
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Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness through People Management  
 
Minimizing the disadvantages of foreignness and maximizing the advantages 
of multinationality are fundamentally imperative for subsidiaries of multinational 
companies; especially, those in emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000). This 
study attempts to extend the prior research on the LOF by investigating the 
performance implications of people management practices in emerging economies; 
particularly, the endorsement of trade unions and the investment in employer-provided 
training. These practices were chosen because 1) they relate to the main aspects of 
people management in the emerging economies in which the government drives low 
wage-based economic developments, and 2) two practices are directly associated with 
the dual imperatives (minimizing disadvantages of foreignness and maximizing 
advantage of multinationality).  
The arguments on the moderators can be summarized as follows. First, the 
government-endorsed trade unions bring more benefits to foreign firms than to 
domestic private firms in emerging economies because they enable foreign firms to 
compensate for the lack of local embeddedness. In other words, unions are to 
contribute to reduce the disadvantages of being foreignness.  
Second, an investment in training provides more benefits to foreign firms than 
to local private firms because the training in foreign firms not only increases the 
immediate skill levels of employees, but also facilitates the transfer of home country 
knowledge. In other words, training will maximize the advantage of multinationality. 
In summary, the negativity (or benefit) of foreignness will be reduced (or 
strengthened) by the two practices. In the following subsections, I will elaborate on 
these arguments. The Figure 4-1 illustrates the hypothesized relationship between 
variables of interest. 
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Legitimacy-Enhancing Employment Relations Institutional theorists have 
suggested that organizational efforts to gain legitimacy influence many organizational 
practices and structures. Legitimacy can be defined as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Unlike traditional economic theories that emphasize rational 
choice of economic actors, institutional theory suggests that, in order for organizations 
to survive and prosper, they need to adopt structures and practices that are accepted by 
local constituents (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) argued that assuring legitimacy is a demanding 
task for foreign firms. Local people may apply different standards toward foreign 
firms than domestic firms. Behaviors of foreign firms are interpreted based on local 
Foreign 
Ownership
Firm 
profitability
Government endorsed
Trade Union
Training Investment
H1
H2
H3
Model 
Figure 4.1 
  106
customers’ mental frameworks rather than those of the home country (Brannen, 2004). 
Among local interest groups, foreign-owned companies are easy targets for criticism 
because indigenous people may perceive foreign firms as “others” rather than “part of 
us.” The lack of legitimacy makes foreign firms be vulnerable to various risks 
including appropriation of the business (Gardberg & Fombrum, 2006). Therefore, 
assuring the reputation as good corporate citizens in the host country is a challenging 
but critical task for the survival and prosperity of foreign-owned firms.  
The legitimation literature has suggested that organizations can enhance their 
legitimacy by formulating alliances with other organizations of high status in their 
field (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007). Resource dependency theory also suggests that 
organizations can improve their chances of survival by co-opting critical resource 
providers (Pfeffer, 1973). In an emerging economy, the government is the single most 
important resource provider and the source of legitimacy. Therefore, developing good 
relations with the government is crucial for companies in the effort to establish and 
maintain legitimacy (Peng & Luo, 2000). 
In an emerging economy, the recognition of government-endorsed trade unions 
can be an act that shows respect to the government, and therefore enhances positive 
relations with the local stakeholders. Although a significant degree of heterogeneity 
has been observed across emerging economies’ industrial relations (Kuruvilla & 
Venkataratnam, 1996; Morley, Gunnigle, & Collings, 2006), trade unions in emerging 
economies generally have strong relationships with the government or major political 
parties. For example, Chinese and Vietnamese trade unions are largely considered to 
be extensions of the Communist government. Trade unions in India are affiliated with 
major political parties and have a strong influence in domestic politics. Trade unions 
in Malaysia and Indonesia are tightly controlled by the government. Labor movements 
in Latin American countries such as Brazil and Chile operate under the tradition of 
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corporatism in which the state controls and assists trade unions. In general, the role of 
trade unions in an emerging economy tends to be in line with the government’s 
economic development agenda. Trade unions in the rapidly developing countries are 
often conceived of as a governmental organ whose mission is to maintain the 
harmonious workplace so that the country can attract foreign direct investment 
(Frenkel & Kuruvilla, 2002). Therefore, recognizing trade unions in these countries 
needs to be understood, at least in part, within a framework of governmental relations 
rather than through pure employee-employer relationships. In other words, 
government-endorsed trade unions can enhance the legitimacy of recognizing 
companies by promoting positive relations with the government, the most important 
resource provider in an emerging economy. 
I argue that the effect of legitimation by recognizing trade unions will be 
stronger in foreign firms than domestic firms. Unlike foreign firms, domestic firms 
tend to have various alternative ways for developing good relationships with 
government due to in-depth local networks. For example, Xin and Pearce (1996) 
showed that the guanxi (social relationship) is an important method of acquiring 
institutional support for private companies in the emerging economy of China. 
However, foreign-owned firms find it difficult to establish the personal relationships 
with governmental officials that their domestic counterparts enjoy. Therefore, 
developing institutional relations with government is critical in order for foreign firms 
to survive and prosper. In this regard, recognizing the government-sponsored trade 
union can be an effective measure for a foreign firm to use to enhance institutional 
relations with government and further legitimate itself in the emerging economy.  
Recognizing the nationally endorsed trade union may also increase the 
legitimacy within a foreign firm because it gives a signal to employees that the 
company respects local institutions, workers’ rights, and employees’ well-being. The 
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diversity within the multinational firms, especially the dissimilarity between 
expatriates and local employees in subsidiaries, is a source of social conflict that can 
undermine the effectiveness of human resource management practices (Cooper, 
Doucet, & Pratt, 2007; Lu & Xu, 2006). In foreign-owned firms operating in emerging 
economies, local employees may easily categorize foreign expatriates as members of 
the out-group (Cooper et al., 2007) and develop negative sentiments that lead to their 
resistance to managerial decisions made by the expatriates (Meardi, 2006). Therefore, 
multinational companies need to develop symbols that show their human resource 
practices are not solely initiated by foreigners, but are monitored by and coordinated 
with local institutions such as trade union branches.  
The above arguments suggest that the presence of government-endorsed trade 
unions will weaken the negative impact of foreignness in emerging economies. This 
means that, on the one hand, if it is true that foreign ownership is positively associated 
with firm performance, then the effect will be stronger for firms that have recognized 
trade unions. On the other hand, if it is true that foreign ownership is negatively 
associated with firm performance, then the effect will be weaker for firms that have 
recognized trade unions. 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Trade union presence moderates the relationship between 
foreign majority ownership and firm performance in such a way that the relationship is 
more positive in unionized companies. 
Hypothesis 2b. Trade union presence moderates the relationship between 
foreign majority ownership and firm performance in such a way that the relationship is 
less negative in unionized companies. 
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Knowledge Transfer-Enhancing Practices  The resource-based view of the 
firm (Barney, 1991) suggests that a sustainable competitive advantage can be assured 
by resources that are valuable, unique, scarce, and difficult to imitate. Following this 
logic, scholars have suggested that effective human resource management practices 
that develop a valuable, unique, scarce, and inimitable pool of human capital are the 
basis for an enduring competitive advantage (Lepak & Snell, 1999; Wright, 
McMahan, & McWilliam, 1994). Employer-provided training is a good example of 
the effective human resource management practices because it enhances the value and 
uniqueness of firms’ human capital at least in two ways. First, training increases the 
firm-specific capability that resides in existing employees. Researchers have noted that 
human capital which brings sustainable competitive advantages is developed within 
the firm rather than bought in the market (Lepak & Snell, 1999). Second, 
developmentally focused human resource practices contribute to attracting and 
retaining high-quality human capital pools that are scarce in labor market (Huselid, 
1995). Therefore, employer-provided training is likely to have positive impacts on 
firm performance as has been shown in a number of empirical studies (e.g., Aragon-
Sanchez, Barba-Aragon, & Sanz-Valle, 2003; Bartel, 1994; Russell, Terborg, &, 
Powers, 1985).  
Besides the general organizational benefits of training, I argue that employer-
provided training brings more gains to foreign-owned firms than domestic firms in 
emerging economies because it assists multinational companies to better realize their 
the home-based knowledge advantage. Unlike domestic firms, foreign firms have 
access to valuable knowledge accumulated in overseas units. The advantage of being 
connected to global networks is the primary source for foreign companies to utilize in 
offsetting the disadvantages of foreignness and successfully competing with local 
competitors. Porter (1990) noted: 
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“In practice, firms that do not exploit and extend their home-based advantages 
through competing globally are vulnerable. . . . As the globalization of competition has 
become widely recognized, attention has been focused on system advantages and on 
the benefits of locating in other nations. In fact, home-based advantages are usually 
more significant to competitive advantage [than location-based advantages]” (pp. 60–
61). 
 
This ownership advantage, however, is not fully realized in foreign subsidiaries 
unless the knowledge is actually transmitted across borders. Studies have suggested 
that the knowledge inflow from the parent company to foreign subsidiaries is 
significantly influenced by the subsidiaries’ capacity to acquire knowledge (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Wang, Tong, & Koh, 2004). The capacity to acquire knowledge 
from other units is subject to the familiarity of recipient units with incoming 
knowledge, and the quality of communication channels between the sender and 
recipients (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000).  
If the recipient unit is totally unfamiliar with the knowledge stored in the 
sending units, the transfer of knowledge will be limited. For instance, manufacturing 
systems that have been developed based on the principles of Six Sigma techniques 
cannot generate the same level of productivity in the local subsidiaries unless the 
employees are trained to understand the basics of the procedures. The lack of 
communication channels also can cause serious problems in the transmission of the 
knowledge across national borders. These are especially critical issues for subsidiaries 
in emerging economies in which local employees’ skills and knowledge are generally 
low (Lyles & Salk, 1996; Wang et al., 2004), and expatriates are easily segregated 
from local employees (Chen, Choi, & Chi, 2002; Toh & DeNisi, 2003).  
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Employer-provided training can assist subsidiaries in assuring a smooth 
transfer of knowledge from their overseas units by addressing the two problems 
mentioned above. First, training will increase the absorptive capacity of subsidiaries. 
Employer-provided training in subsidiaries will familiarize local employees with the 
firm-specific knowledge of foreign origin, which will enable the workers to fully 
understand and make use of the systems and practices transferred from the parent 
company. Second, the personal interactions between foreign experts and local 
employees during the training will enhance the social capital between the parent 
company and subsidiaries, which will strengthen the continuous inflow of knowledge 
(Kostova & Roth, 2003). 
In summary, I argue employer-provided training has a larger positive impact 
on foreign firms than domestic firms because it facilitates the cross-national transfer of 
firm-specific knowledge from overseas units to subsidiaries of multinational firms. 
This means that, on the one hand, if it is true that foreign ownership is positively 
associated with firm performance, then the effect will be stronger for firms with a high 
level of training investment. On the other hand, if it is true that foreign ownership is 
negatively associated with firm performance, then the effect will be weaker for firms 
with a higher level of training investment. 
 
Hypothesis 3a.Training investment moderates the relationship between foreign 
majority ownership and firm performance in such a way that the relationship is more 
positive in unionized companies. 
Hypothesis 3b.Training investment moderates the relationship between foreign 
majority ownership and firm performance in such a way that the relationship is less 
negative in unionized companies. 
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METHOD 
 
Data and Sample 
 
 This study began with qualitative research during my extensive fieldwork 
conducted in China between June 2006 and July 2007. Although the study is deductive 
in nature, the fieldwork assisted me in developing an in-depth understanding of the 
empirical context, which increased the appropriateness of model specification and 
results interpretation. Fifty-nine interviews were conducted with managers of foreign-
owned companies working in 40 establishments across 11 coastal cities. Twenty-five 
establishments were subsidiaries of 10 Fortune 500 companies (4 U.S., 4 Asian, and 2 
European) while others were affiliated with small- and medium-sized companies. To 
draw a more complete picture of the reality, nine officials of the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions, one official in the International Labor Organization’s Beijing office, 
seven representatives of foreign employer organizations, two central government 
administrators, and two officers of special economic zones were interviewed. The 
format of interviews was semi-structured and each interview lasted between 1 and 3 
hours. Expatriates were interviewed in English and Korean while Chinese employees 
and officials were interviewed through translators.  
To quantitatively test the proposed hypotheses, I used nationally representative 
survey data conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The original 2004 
survey data presumably includes all manufacturing firms classified as state-owned 
enterprises, and other manufacturing enterprises that reported more than 5 million 
yuan (approximately US$600,000) of annual sales in the previous year. For these 
firms, the bureau reports financial statement information, number of employees, 
number of labor union members, the amount of the trade union fee, and training 
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investment. By law, all businesses in China are required to collaborate with the bureau 
for this survey.  
I excluded state-owned enterprises (companies with more than 50% of state 
ownership) because the organizational dynamics regarding the trade union and human 
resource management might be different from that of private sector businesses. I also 
excluded firms associated with capital from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan because 
their legal status, in the perspective of the People’s Republic of China, does not fit into 
the foreign-domestic dichotomy. By excluding a small number of firms in primary 
industries such as coal mining, the final sample contains only manufacturing 
companies. To increase the integrity of the dataset, I deleted blatant outliers and cases 
with obviously inaccurate numbers such as negative total assets. There were 224,433 
firms in the final data that I analyzed. Although the reliability of Chinese data has 
been an issue in academia, this source of data has been recognized as reliable in a 
number of academic studies (Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2002; Xu et al., 2006). To the 
best my knowledge, this 2004 data is the first, only, and the most complete nationwide 
survey data in the emerging economy of China that contains information on industrial 
relations and human resource management.  
 
Measures  
 
Return on equity (ROE) was used as the performance variable. It is the 
accounting ratio often used to measure the effectiveness of management (Richard & 
Johnson, 2001). To examine the effect of the LOF, I created a dummy variable that 
indicated the foreign majority ownership (more than 50% of foreign equity). Studies 
have shown that the majority ownership has important consequences on the choice of 
managerial actions (Jaggi & Tsui, 2007; Lin & Kamal, 2004). Also in China, “the 
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decision-making power is determined on the basis of  . . . equity ownership” (Huang, 
2003, p. 19). The fieldwork in China confirmed that foreign managers make the major 
human resource decisions in companies with majority foreign ownership while 
Chinese managers have more decision-making power in firms with minority foreign 
ownership. 
The trade union was measured by the number of union members divided by the 
total number of employees. According to Chinese law, employees in a company that 
hires more than 25 individuals can organize a company branch of the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions. However, in reality, the union branch at the enterprise is 
initiated by the firm instead of the employees. The fieldwork indicates that, except in 
rare cases such as Chinese Wal-Mart, domestic private and foreign-owned firms have 
been allowed to determine their position toward unions, even in the midst of the recent 
unionization campaign. Although the law suggests that unions, once established, are 
supposed to cover all employees including management, a significant variance is 
observed in the union coverage. I assumed that the coverage rate indicates the degree 
to which a firm has a proactive and positive attitude toward unions. 
Several aspects of firm-specific characteristics were controlled. State 
ownership proportion was included to control for the potential state influence on 
domestic private or foreign firms. The size was measured by the logarithms of 
employee number. The liability of newness (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986) was also 
controlled by including the logarithm of company age. The level of current human 
capital was controlled by an imperfect proxy measure of social wage, which is the 
combination of housing benefit, unemployment insurance, and medical insurance (per 
individual). Conformity of the local managerial practices was measured by the 
“management expense.” In China, the manager of a company is allowed to use this 
money at his or her own discretion as a lubricant that facilitates the daily managerial 
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operations. This money can be used for various occasions such as rewarding high 
performers or buying out problematic employees. Advertising expense was included to 
control for the local market strategy. As for the environmental factors, the provincial 
union recognition rate was included to address the institutional pressures of 
unionization in the region. Finally, 13 dummy variables for most industrialized regions 
were included to control for any region specific factors.  
 
Analytic Approach  
I employed hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypotheses. Variance 
inflation factors (VIF) did not show significant multicollinearity (VIF < 3.02). 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality indicated that there was no significant 
violation of normality assumption at the .05 level of statistical significance.  
 
 
 
Mean s.e. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 ROE 0.17 0.28
2 Foreignness 0.09 0.28 -0.05
3 Union 0.31 0.41 -0.05 -0.02
4 Training (log) 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.13
5 State Ownership 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.09 0.05
6 Comp Age (log) 1.60 0.94 -0.03 -0.03 0.26 0.05 0.07
7 Size (log) 4.57 1.07 -0.03 0.12 0.22 0.01 0.08 0.19
8 Social Wage (log) 0.49 0.66 -0.07 0.17 0.30 0.25 0.14 0.23 0.09
9 Traditionality 0.07 2.80 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02
10 CompetitivePressure
0.19 0.39 -0.03 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.19 0.20 0.00
11 RegionalUnionization
0.31 0.09 -0.02 -0.11 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.03
Variable
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
  116
RESULTS 
 
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations. The dependent 
variable ROE was negatively correlated with foreign majority ownership and trade 
union presence while positively correlated with training investment. These 
correlations were all statistically significant (p < 0.001). Table 4.2 provides the results 
of the hierarchical regression analyses. The results generally support the four proposed 
hypotheses. The F statistic shows that all three models are significant (p < 0.001). The 
changes of R2 were also statistically significant (p < 0.001).  
Between the two alternative hypotheses, the data supported the second 
hypothesis that the foreign majority ownership is negatively associated with firm 
performance (Hypothesis 1b). That means that, other things being equal, foreign-
owned firms achieve lower firm performance than Chinese domestic firms.  
As predicted, the trade union interacted with foreign majority ownership in a 
positive way in Hypothesis 2b. The results suggest that foreign-owned firms can 
reduce the performance disadvantage by recognizing unions. The training investment 
had a positive interaction effect with foreign majority ownership (Hypothesis 3b). 
That means, foreign-owned firms acquire higher return on investment in training than 
Chinese domestic firms. In the Figure 4.2, I provide interaction plots that depict the 
moderation effect of the trade union and training investment. Although I did not 
specify the main effect of the trade union and the training, the results provide some 
useful information on the main effects. Specifically, the trade union was found to have 
a very strong negative impact on the firm performance of domestic private firms while 
the training had generally positive impacts on performance.                           
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Table 4.2 
Robust Regression Results 
Mean SD
Foreignness 0.087 (0.282) -0.040 (0.002) *** -0.056 (0.003) ***
Union 0.312 (0.410) -0.021 (0.002) *** -0.024 (0.002) ***
Training 0.080 (0.179) 0.059 (0.012) *** 0.050 (0.005) ***
Union x Foreignness 0.025 (0.144) 0.036 (0.011) ***
Training x Foreignness 0.007 (0.070) 0.065 (0.012) ***
Control
state ownership
proportion
0.005 (0.043) -0.118 (0.012) *** -0.109 (0.004) *** -0.117 (0.004) ***
log(comp age) 1.603 (0.936) -0.004 (0.001) *** -0.003 (0.001) *** -0.003 (0.001) ***
log(employee number) 4.571 (1.065) -0.006 (0.001) *** -0.003 (0.001) *** -0.003 (0.001) ***
log(social wage per
person)
0.487 (0.664) -0.016 (0.001) *** -0.014 (0.001) *** -0.014 (0.001) ***
management expense 0.074 (2.797) -0.001 (0.000) * -0.001 (0.000) * -0.001 (0.000) *
advertise expense 0.002 (0.391) -3.421 (0.001) * -0.006 (0.001) *** -0.006 (0.001) ***
regional union recog
rate
0.309 (0.090) -0.085 (0.021) *** -0.085 (0.021) *** -0.082 (0.021) ***
Beijing 0.025 (0.158) -0.009 (0.004) * -0.009 (0.004) * -0.009 (0.004) *
Tianjin 0.023 (0.149) 0.037 (0.006) *** 0.042 (0.006) *** 0.043 (0.006) ***
Hebei 0.033 (0.179) 0.154 (0.005) *** 0.155 (0.005) *** 0.154 (0.005) ***
Liaoning 0.037 (0.188) 0.023 (0.004) *** 0.028 (0.004) *** 0.027 (0.004) ***
Shanghai 0.056 (0.229) 0.059 (0.004) *** 0.061 (0.004) *** 0.062 (0.004) ***
Jiangsu 0.171 (0.376) 0.039 (0.002) *** 0.041 (0.002) *** 0.041 (0.002) ***
Zhejiang 0.177 (0.382) 0.070 (0.002) *** 0.069 (0.002) *** 0.069 (0.002) ***
Fujian 0.038 (0.191) 0.013 (0.003) *** 0.019 (0.003) *** 0.019 (0.003) ***
Shandong 0.098 (0.298) 0.129 (0.004) *** 0.132 (0.004) *** 0.132 (0.004) ***
Henan 0.041 (0.198) 0.141 (0.005) *** 0.140 (0.005) *** 0.140 (0.005) ***
Hunan 0.025 (0.156) 0.053 (0.005) *** 0.052 (0.005) *** 0.052 (0.005) ***
Guangdong 0.107 (0.309) 0.019 (0.005) *** 0.022 (0.005) *** 0.023 (0.005) ***
Sichuan 0.027 (0.161) -0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004)
Constant 0.195 (0.008) *** 0.184 (0.008) *** 0.184 (0.008) ***
n
F 305.6 *** 300.12 *** 279.1 ***
R-squared 0.033 0.036 0.037
R-squared Change 0.004 *** 0.001 ***
205374 205374 205374
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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(2a) Trade Union and the Foreign Majority Ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2b) Training Investment and the Foreign Majority Ownership 
 
Interaction Plots  
Figure 4.2 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
I examined the moderating effects of the trade union and training investment 
on the relationship between the foreign ownership and firm performance in China. The 
empirical results show that foreign-owned companies in the emerging economy of 
China are experiencing the LOF, and the negative impact of LOF is moderated by 
recognizing the company branch of the national trade union and investment in 
training.  
This study contributes to the international management and international 
human resource management literatures. Given the importance of the LOF in the 
success of multinational corporations, studies have attempted to identify ways to 
moderate the negative impact of the LOF. Recently, researchers have begun to 
examine the role of human resource management for moderating the LOF, but mainly 
in the U.S. context (e.g., Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, & Shimizu, 2006; Matsuo, 2000; 
Mezias, 2002). The current study contributes to this line of research by: (a) exploring 
the issue in the emerging economy of China, which has attracted the largest amount of 
foreign direct investment over the past decade (Huang, 2003); (b) investigating both 
elements of institutional and firm-specific competency factors; and (c) examining not 
only human resource management practices, but also trade unions, which are a critical 
concern in developing countries.  
Major findings of this study also contribute to the body of research industrial 
relations. Industrial relations scholars have investigated the relationship between the 
presence of a trade union and firm performance (Bennett & Kaufman, 2007). On the 
one hand, a traditional view of the research conducted on unionism in the United 
States posited that trade unions tend to have negative impact on the profitability of 
firms (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). On the other hand, a context-specific study found 
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that the impact of Chinese trade unions on organizational outcomes was negligible 
(Ding, Goodall, & Warner, 2002). Contrary to these prior works, the current study 
proposes the possibility of a positive performance impact of the trade union in the 
context of the foreign-invested sector in emerging economies. In the emerging 
economy of China, recognizing the trade union may function as symbolic, although 
not necessarily substantive, action of the good corporate citizen. This aspect of trade 
unions may positively affect foreign-owned companies’ performance where it has 
been negatively affected by a lack of local legitimacy. Considering the general 
public’s recent attention to the “corporate social responsibility,” more studies are 
required to determine the antecedents and consequences of this aspect of the trade 
union effect, especially in other contexts. 
Findings of this study have significant practical implications. First, the study 
questions the validity of some foreign managers’ beliefs and concerns about the 
negative impact of trade unions in emerging economies. One manager that I 
interviewed in Beijing told me that “the acceptance of trade unions will do more harm 
to foreign-owned companies than to domestic companies.” According to the results of 
this study, however, trade unions in emerging economies may contribute to the 
management of foreign-owned companies through moderating the LOF.  
Second, the significant direct and moderating effect of training expenditures on 
firm performance justifies the investment in training, even in the face of a high 
turnover situation in an emerging economy. Due to high labor mobility in the foreign-
invested sector, some managers of foreign companies have doubts about developing 
human capital in emerging markets. The results of this study suggest, however, that 
training investment does have a significant positive impact on a company’s bottom 
line; especially, that of foreign-owned firms.  
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Surprisingly, the results suggest that grassroots trade unions have a significant 
negative impact on the performance of domestic private firms. On the surface, this 
result is consistent with the findings of previous research in the U.S. context. Studies 
on trade unions in the United States have argued that trade unions have significant 
direct effects on firm profitability (e.g., Freeman & Medoff, 1984). But, the results of 
U.S.-based trade union studies should not be directly applied to Chinese context 
because the Chinese trade union does not have the monopoly power, nor the right, to 
organize collective actions within firms (Liu, 2008). One possible explanation for this 
surprising finding is that the trade union fee (2% of the total wage) and other related 
costs directly impact a company’s bottom line. Because the firms in the sample are 
manufacturing companies that possibly are competing in the price sensitive market, 
the costs associated with maintaining a trade union may directly affect a company’s 
financial margin. The general manager of a toy manufacturing company located in 
Shandong Province stated that the firm could not afford to have a trade union because 
it would lose buyers once it failed to keep costs to the bottom line (Qingdao, personal 
communication, April 28, 2007). Future studies should examine the validity of this 
explanation or explore other possible explanations for the negative relation between 
the trade union and firm performance in China and other emerging economies.  
The current study has several methodological limitations mainly caused by the 
data availability. First of all, the performance data used in this study may not 
completely reflect the firms’ financial performance because foreign companies often 
reduce the profitability of their local subsidiaries by manipulating transfer prices. 
Although this possibility may not necesarrily undermine the core arguments of the 
paper, the results should be interpreted with caution.  
In addition, the causality argument of this study should be further tested by 
longitudinal data analysis. Since the current analysis only used cross-sectional dataset, 
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there is inherent limitation to establish concrete causal relations between variables. 
Future studies need to address this issue by using multi-year datasets.  
Finally, generalizability of the findings needs to be examined in other 
emerging economies. Previous studies have noted that emerging economies have 
adopted different economic developmental strategies that have differentially affected 
the role of trade unions (Kuruvilla & Venkataratnam, 1996). Therefore, future 
research needs to determine if the arguments and findings of this study are valid in 
emerging economies that have adopted developmental strategies different from those 
of China.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has addressed three important issues of human resource 
management and industrial relations in the context of the People’s Republic of China 
using institutional and strategic perspectives. The first study (chapter 2) critically 
reviews the current status of strategic human resource management (SHRM) research. 
I argue that the research to date in this field is built on several assumptions, the 
validity of which may not endure beyond the borders of the United States where much 
of the existing research in this realm has been conducted. This study contextualizes the 
mainstream SHRM research by comparing institutional environments around human 
resource management between the United States and China. Finally, I provide 
reflections and suggestions on how the contextualized understanding of the literature 
can contribute to resolving and reframing central concerns of SHRM research. 
The second study (chapter 3) addresses a major concern relevant to 
international business research in qualitatively investigating how subsidiaries of 
multinational companies deal with dual institutional pressures from the parent 
company and the local environment. Using Chinese trade unions as an empirical 
context, I develop a model that explains how the dual institutional pressures and 
organizational characteristics jointly shape the subsidiaries’ attitudes and behaviors 
toward a unique local employment relations practice. I analyze qualitative data that I 
collected in my 13 months of fieldwork for this study. 
The third study (chapter 4) involves a quantitative data analysis of Chinese 
companies in the manufacturing sector. The major concern of this study is whether 
unions and employer-provided training affect firm performance differently depending 
on the ownership structure. I argue that recognizing unions in China is more beneficial 
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for foreign than domestic firms because it reduces the problem of deficient legitimacy 
in the local market. I also argue that the positive impact of employer-provided training 
on firm performance is stronger in foreign-owned firms than in domestic firms in 
China because foreign companies, unlike domestic firms, can expect an additional 
benefit of training: the cross-border knowledge inflow. The results of regression 
analyses generally support the hypotheses.  
 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Although the three studies address different issues using distinctive 
methodologies, they share common features that have important theoretical and 
practical implications. Theoretically, the three studies collectively extend the scope of 
human resource management studies by explicitly incorporating elements of 
institutional theory.  
Although diverse intellectual traditions have used the term institutions in quite 
different ways, it can be broadly defined as a combination of regulatory, normative, 
and cultural elements that stabilizes social life. In the area of human resource 
management, I understand the institutional perspective to be a view that emphasizes 
the impacts of contextual factors (e.g., regulations, social norms, national culture, 
industry effect, and historical background) on organizations’ employment and human 
resource management practices. This perspective acknowledges that people 
management practices are not formulated and maintained solely by the rational 
calculations of managers. Rather, it pays attention to the processes in which 
employment relations and human resource management practices emerge over time 
through the interactions among diverse stakeholders, including: managers, employees, 
national governments, unions, and professional organizations. The institutional 
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perspective also appreciates the fact that not all companies operate under the same 
institutional environments. Therefore, it is open to the possibility that the same set of 
organizational practices may lead to significantly different organizational outcomes in 
different institutional environments.  
The three studies in this dissertation explore how institutional perspectives—
the framework that acknowledges the impact of regulatory, normative, and cultural 
factors—can provide new insights into the study of human resource management and 
industrial relations in the globalized economy. For example, the first study (chapter 2) 
argues that the previous SHRM research has been shaped by the institutional context 
of a liberal market economy.  
The second study (chapter 3) draws more directly from institutional theories 
and explains how people management practices of firms are shaped by institutional 
contexts. Unlike earlier works in this area that emphasize the pattern of conformity of 
subsidiaries to institutional pressures, the findings in chapter 3 specify the conditions 
under which organizational characteristics and the duality of institutional pressures 
create a leeway for subsidiaries to formulate their own responses.   
The third study (chapter 4) explores the performance implications of adopting 
socially legitimate employment relations practices. As I suggest in the first study 
(chapter 2), the relative ignorance of institutional contexts has been a critical weakness 
of prior human resource management studies, particularly those in the tradition of 
SHRM. The three studies in this dissertation jointly contribute to the literature by 
acknowledging and illuminating the influence of the institutional context on people 
management practices. 
The three studies also contribute to the literature of international human 
resource management. International human resource management has emerged as a 
distinct field of study over recent decades. Scholars in this area have examined a 
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variety of people management issues in the globalized economy, particularly the 
issues of expatriate adjustments, global human resource systems of multinational 
corporations, and convergence/divergence of human resource practices around the 
globe.  
The first study (chapter 2) in this dissertation suggests that SHRM needs to be 
understood as a part of international human resource management studies, not the 
other way around. As I argue in this study, the current SHRM research has produced 
incomplete knowledge on the relationship between human resource management and 
firm performance because the field did not seriously consider the fact that institutional 
environments are not the same across countries. By acknowledging that human 
resource management may affect firm performance differently in a different national 
context, this study highlights the criticality of international perspectives as an 
overarching framework for SHRM research.     
The second study (chapter 3) contributes to international human resource 
management research by employing Chinese trade unions as a main variable. Due to 
the influence of U.S.-based human resource management research, scholars of 
international human resource management tend to ignore the significance of industrial 
relations variables in the management of local subsidiaries. Instead, they tend to 
overemphasize human resource management practices that are usually considered 
important for U.S. firms operating in the U.S. context. My study takes the context 
more openly, and explores the dynamics of people management in local subsidiaries 
around trade unions.  
The third study (chapter 4) directly addresses the main concern of international 
business, the liability of foreignness which is defined as the disadvantages of doing 
business abroad. This study is differentiated from the previous line of research on the 
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liability of foreignness by introducing the idea that the disadvantages of being foreign 
can be moderated by effective people management practices.       
 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIOS 
 
In addition to various theoretical contributions, the three studies jointly offer a 
number of practical suggestions for multinational corporations operating in China. 
China is the largest emerging market in the world, and it is attracting an enormous 
number of multinational corporations. Companies originating in developed economies 
are bringing their knowledge and capabilities to China’s developing economy in an 
attempt to replicate their prior success in other emerging markets. However, the 
unique institutional environment in China does not allow multinational corporations to 
achieve success easily. Among other challenges, multinational corporations must 
overcome the liability that stems from their lack of local embeddedness. In order for 
multinational companies to reduce the costs of doing business abroad, they will have 
to understand the limitations of previously accepted knowledge and identify methods 
to moderate their inherent disadvantages as foreigners.  
The first study (chapter 2) offers practical implications for multinational firms 
in that it identifies the reasons for which existing formulations of SHRM may not 
work in the emerging economy of China. Multinational companies often attempt to 
replicate their human resource management systems in local subsidiaries. Many 
multinational firms in China that followed this path have come to realize that the 
homemade systems do not work as expected. More often than not, expatriate managers 
have attributed this failure to the ambiguous concept of cultural difference or to the 
lack of skill or professionalism of local employees. This study offers an overall 
framework for understanding why human resource systems that have originated in one 
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institutional context may not function fully in other contexts. By comparing the 
regulatory, normative, and cultural differences between the home and host countries, 
managers of foreign subsidiaries will be better able to identify potentially 
nonfunctioning elements in their standardized human resource systems.  
The second study (chapter 3) is also beneficial for practitioners in that 
subsidiaries actively find solutions to unfamiliar local practices within the given 
institutional constraints. This study provides a conceptual map that shows how 
institutional duality interacts with organizational characteristics regarding subsidiaries’ 
reactions to local union practices. This conceptual model not only may assist managers 
of subsidiaries in China, but also managers of multinational firms generally to 
formulate appropriate strategies toward local employment practices. 
Finally, the third study (chapter 4) encourages subsidiary managers to be 
attentive to locally legitimate labor practices by showing that unions in China make a 
difference in the’ financial performance of firms. Many popular reports have described 
the recent unionization campaign in China as a potential threat to the management of 
foreign companies. However, the findings in this study suggest that foreign-owned 
firms can expect benefits rather than disadvantages from recognizing unions. At least, 
the study strongly indicates that the concern for the potential negative impact of 
unions on the performance of foreign companies is largely exaggerated and cannot be 
supported by the empirical data.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The findings of the three studies in this dissertation have answered important 
questions, but many more questions remain unanswered. One of the unanswered 
questions involves identifying the pattern of difference in the relationship between 
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human resource practices and institutional environments. In the first study (chapter 2), 
I indicated that the way that human resource management drives firm performance 
may vary according to the institutional environment. This argument needs to be further 
validated by empirical studies that incorporate data from multiple types of institutional 
environments. For example, future research could examine how the relationship 
between high-commitment work practices and firm performance is moderated by the 
national regulatory, normative, and cultural environment.  
Another unanswered question has to do with the role of actors toward 
institutional environments. The three studies in this dissertation commonly showed 
that human resource management and industrial relations practices of private 
companies are significantly affected by the national political, regulatory, normative, 
and cultural contexts. However, the studies do not present a sufficiently clear picture 
that captures the efforts of actors (e.g., subsidiaries, unions, and the government) to 
proactively modify the institutional environment in order to generate more favorable 
situations for them. In this respect, future research may need to incorporate recent 
developments of theories on the relationship between organizations and institutional 
environments, particularly the insights offered by the institutional entrepreneurship 
literature. If we can better understand how multinational corporations proactively 
influence their institutional environments with respect to human resource 
management, we could develop a better approach to the debate about global 
convergence and divergence in the area of human resource management.  
The external validity of my findings is another critical issue that should be 
addressed by future research. Although the three studies provide useful insights on 
human resource management and industrial relations in mainland China, whether these 
findings will also be valid in other transitional economies is a matter in question. Even 
though it was a reasonable choice for me to choose China as an empirical context, I 
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cannot claim cross-national generalizability unless I am able to present convincing 
evidence that a similar phenomenon is observed in other transitional economies.  
The transitional economy of China is moving toward a new era. While the 
inflow of foreign direct investment is likely to continue to be massive for some time, 
the nature of foreign investment is changing. In the past, the main interest of foreign 
investors was the cheap workforce in the Chinese manufacturing sector. Recently, 
however, foreign investors have begun to pay attention to the growing domestic 
markets. As this change occurs, the regulatory, normative, and cultural landscape of 
China with respect to employment relations and human resource management will also 
turn toward a new chapter. How these changing institutional environments will affect 
the antecedents and consequences of the strategic choices made by multinational 
companies is a critical subject of academic inquiry for which this dissertation lays an 
initial building block.        
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APPENDIX 
Description of Cases 
* First tier cities are Beijing/Shanghai; second tier cities include Tianjin, Nanjing, Hangzhou; third tier cities 
include Qingdao, Huizhou, Donguan. 
** see the Table 3.1 for details 
Company Business Description Location* Origin Interview Total 
Coretech Manufactures core parts of electronics appliances Third tier, South Asian 
CEO, HR VP (union 
leader), HR manager 3 
Display Manufactures display parts of electronics appliances Second tier, East 
Euro-
Asian 
Joint 
HR VP, HR VP, HR 
director 3 
Service Information Technology solutions First tier, East US 
Senior HR VP, HR VP, 
ER director 3 
Hightech System integration solutions First tier, East US HR director, local staff 2 
Solution Information Technology solutions First tier, North US HR director 1 
Equip Provides building infrastructure First tier, North US HR director 1 
Energy Provides energy solutions First tier, North Europe HR VP 1 
Auto Assembles automobile First tier, North Europe HR director (local) 1 
Road Manufacturing major auto parts Second tier, East Asia CEO, HR VP 2 
Steel Steel Manufacturing First tier, North Asia  HR VP 1 
Telecom Telecommunication First tier, North Asia HR VP, HR director 2 
Build Provide building equipment Third tier, East Asia  Engineer 1 
Pharm Pharmaceutical company First tier, North Asia HR VP 1 
SME1 Manufacturing apparel First tier, Eastern Asia  HR director, HR staff 2 
SME2 Manufacturing electronic parts Second tier, North Asia CEO, VP 2 
SME3 Manufacturing electronic parts Second tier, East Asia  VP, HR director 2 
SME4 Manufacturing container Second tier, East Asia CEO, VP 2 
SME5 distribution and sourcing First tier, East Asia  CEO 1 
SME6 Manufacturing home furniture First tier, East Asia CEO 1 
SME7 Manufacturing electronic parts Third tier, South Asia  VP  1 
SME8 Electronics assembly Third tier, South Asia CEO 1 
SME9 Factory facility design service Third tier, South Asia  CEO 1 
SME10 Accessory manufacturing Third tier, North Asia CEO 1 
SME11 Electronics manufacturing Third tier, North Asia  CEO 1 
SME12 Toy manufacturing Third tier, North Asia CEO 1 
Ufree** Consumer Electronics Varies** Asia HR VP, HR directors, and employees** 10 
ProU** Consumer Electronics Varies** Asia 
CEO, HR VP, HR 
directors, union leader 
and employees** 
19 
 Total         67 
 
